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ABSTRACT 
Despite some political openings in Jordan during the 1980s, the democratization process 
is presently stalled.  What explains the lack of continuous democratization in Jordan 
while democratic transitions in many other countries around the world have taken place?  
This study seeks to understand the reasons behind stalled democratization in Jordan by 
analyzing three variables: the nature of the opposition movement; the role of domestic 
and international events in shaping opposition-regime interactions; and the role of U.S.-
European Union (EU) assistance to Jordan.  The major finding of this study is that 
democratization in Jordan has stalled due to the regime’s policy of preventing political 
opportunities to maintain the status quo backed by the U.S. and the EU.  Political 
inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) will bode well for Jordan’s democratic 
progress.  The MB’s strategic behavior has withstood an Islamist radicalization in light of 
repression and unpopular western policy.  Nevertheless, neither the U.S. nor the EU 
pushed for more liberalization, which enables the MB to gain political access.  The U.S. 
and the EU opted for a realist approach, focusing on security in Jordan.  This thesis 
proposes a rethinking of assistance to Jordan based on a burden sharing between the U.S. 
and the EU. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The third wave of democratization has skipped over the Middle East.  Whereas 
major democratic transformations in Latin America, East Asia, Africa, and elsewhere 
emerged, the Middle East remains mired in authoritarian regimes with the façade of 
democratic institutions and procedures.  Jordan is an excellent example of this type of 
“hybrid” regime that has a multiparty system, regularly held elections, and a government 
that utters the language of democratic participation.  Yet, it is anything but a genuinely 
free democracy, as reflected in its Freedom House ranking, which was recently 
downgraded to “not free.”1  The question is: Why has democratization stalled in Jordan? 
This study explores this vexing question by analyzing three aspects of the 
Jordanian polity: the nature of Islamist opposition to the regime in Jordan; the nature of 
regional challenges facing Jordan; and the role of international donors, especially the 
U.S. and the European Union (EU), in the democratization process.  Specifically, this 
study asks the following questions: 
(1) What is the nature of the Islamist movement that challenges the regime in 
Jordan?  What are its strands and strategies toward the regime? 
(2) How do domestic and international factors shape the interaction between the 
Islamist movement and the regime in Jordan, and what effect do these 
interactions have on the democratization process? 
(3) How has international economic assistance shaped the democratization 
process in Jordan?  Has U.S.-EU assistance to Jordan promoted political 
liberalization or hindered it? 
                                                 
1 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2010: Global Erosion of Freedom," 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120 (accessed January 27, 2010). 
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B. IMPORTANCE 
The study of stalled democratization in Jordan is important for three reasons.  
First, Jordan is a vital ally of Western states, recognized as a moderate regime that has 
weathered difficult regional circumstances while siding with the U.S. on major policy 
issues: countering the threat of radical pan-Arab nationalism; promoting peace between 
Arabs and Israel; supporting the war on terrorism; and, presently, is siding with the U.S. 
in its confrontation with Iran.  In addition, in light of the EU enlargement, Jordan’s role 
in providing stability and security in the EU’s neighborhood became more significant. 
Second, interrelated with the first reason, Jordan’s stability is vital because of its 
proximity to Israel, and one of the few Arab countries that has made peace with the 
Jewish state.  Stability and security in the EU’s neighborhood depends on the 
development of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which Jordan seeks to play an 
important role, not least since more than fifty percent of its population are of Palestinian 
provenance. 
Third, understanding the democratization process in Jordan is important because 
it could offer lessons on how democratization progresses and falters, especially in light of 
the fact that Jordan is one of few Muslim countries that allows its Islamist opposition 
groups space in the political and social spheres.  In many ways, Jordan offers the 
potential for learning on two fronts: how to advance democratization, and how to do so 
when the beneficiaries of democracy might be Islamists.  Jordan, in this respect, could 
potentially be another case in a limited universe of cases in which democratization and 
Islamism can coexist (e.g., Turkey, Morocco, and Indonesia). 
C. CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 
The Hashemite Kingdom has been able to sustain a stable monarchy, allowing 
limited democratic progress and defending its place within the international community.  
Western policymakers even think that Jordan contributes to a stable and peaceful Middle 
East and has the potential to become a role model for democratization in other Arab 
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states.2  However, while the third wave of democratization has bypassed the Middle East, 
Jordan became a “hybrid regime,” residing somewhere between authoritarianism and 
democracy.  Political openings as in the late 1980s are short-lived and indicate that the 
Jordanian regime has never intended to follow the path to democracy.  Nevertheless, the 
stability of Jordan’s “halfway house,” as Huntington put it, is higher than expected.3  
Opposing political forces, besides the MB, are weak while rifts within the Jordanian 
population regarding the Transjordan-Palestine divide are growing.  Islamism remains the 
untried but much called for solution to Jordan’s political and social challenges. 
Political opportunities for opposing political forces are not likely to emerge in the 
absence of economic or political “shocks” that could compel the Jordanian regime to 
relinquish decision-making prerogatives.  Jordan is a dependent state in need of aid and 
remittances from neighboring rich Gulf countries, as well as U.S.-EU assistance.  A 
plurality of scholars highlights the importance of the monarchy’s alignment with the 
West from a historical and economic point of view.  They point out Jordan’s economic 
dependency on the West and the states in the Gulf due to Jordan’s scarce resources and 
weak economic basis.  In general, alignment with the West and foreign aid has shaped 
Jordan’s foreign policy, in particular Jordan’s policy of reconciliation with Israel, since 




                                                 
2 Volker Perthes, Geheime Gärten, vol. 2 (München: Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag, 2004), 296. 
3 Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1959), 74; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the 
Late Twentieth Century, vol. 4 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 174–175. 
4 Ilan Pappé, "The State and the Tribe: Egypt and Jordan, 1948-1988," in Jordan in the Middle East: 
The Making of a Pivotal State, eds. Joseph Nevo and Ilan Pappé (Ilford, Essex, England: Frank Cass, 
1994), 61–89; Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, Political Liberalization and Democratization 
in the Arab World: Comparative Experiences, vol. 2 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 93; 
Gil Feiler, "Jordan's Economy, 1970–90: The Primacy of Exogenous Factors," in Jordan in the Middle 
East: The Making of a Pivotal State, eds. Joseph Nevo and Ilan Pappé (Ilford, Essex, England: Frank Cass, 
1994), 45–57; Alan George, Jordan: Living in the Crossfire (London; New York: Zed Books; Distributed 
in the U.S. by Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 63–69; Laurie A. Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The 
Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 81–83, 277–278; 
and Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace 
Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 117–158. 
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dependence on the West is remarkable.  The U.S. and the EU provided 83 percent of 
grant assistance to Jordan in 2002, while U.S. support skyrocketed in light of the Iraq 
War in 2003.5 
The trajectories of Jordan’s foreign policy have affected the stability of the 
Jordanian regime since the country’s foreign relations and economic dependency are 
closely linked.  In short, the Jordanian regime’s alliance with the U.S. places it in direct 
opposition to mass public opinion, reflected in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement.  
As the main opposition force in the social and political realms, the MB is viewed as a 
formidable threat to the regime.  King Abdullah II has chosen an exclusionary strategy 
toward Islamist organizations due to its alliance with the U.S. in a critical period of 
tumultuous regional conflicts (e.g., the second Palestinian uprising; invasion and 
occupation of Iraq; and Israeli wars in Lebanon and Gaza). 
While the political inclusion of the MB may bode well for democratic progress in 
Jordan, Western fears of Islamism have prevented Jordan’s Western allies from pushing 
for genuine liberalization.6  “We are very suspect of those parties and groups that use the 
democratic process to come to power and once they’re in power they destroy the 
democratic process and stay in power.”7   Nevertheless, “defensive democratization” in 
Jordan might not withstand the dynamic of Islamization in times of political and 
economic crisis.8  How, then, do the U.S. and the EU respond to this dynamic? 
In light of Jordan’s dependence on U.S. and EU assistance, the doors for 
promoting democracy are supposed to be open.  However, as noted, since liberalization 
has stalled, U.S. and EU assistance has stabilized Jordan’s status quo.  A realist approach 
                                                 
5 "USAID/Jordan Strategy 2004–2009: Gateway to the Future," 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABZ632.pdf (accessed April 21, 2010). 
6 Mustapha K. Sayyid, "International Dimensions of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism: The G8 and 
External Efforts at Political Reform," in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in 
Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 222–
224. 
7 Edward P. Djerejian, "Danger and Opportunity: An American Ambassador’s Journey through the 
Middle East," http://www.lawac.org (accessed November 7, 2009). 
8 Glenn E. Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 30, no. 3 (1998): 387. 
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seems to dominate U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan while security and stability come 
first.  As Islamism is widely seen in light of security threats, the U.S. and the EU do not 
seem willing to put pressure on the Hashemite regime to enhance further liberalization 
that would enable substantial political inclusion of moderate Islamist organizations. 
This conceptual context sheds light on two debates, which are central to this 
study.  (1) Does political inclusion lead to the moderation of Islamist organizations?  (2) 
Is U.S.-EU assistance beneficial or deleterious to democratization in Jordan?  Before 
addressing these debates, it is important to describe the nature of Jordan’s stalled 
democratization. 
1. Jordan as a Hybrid Regime 
Scholars studying regime types in the Middle East argue that elections have 
become one element of Jordan’s democratic façade as a prerequisite for stability of the 
Jordanian “hybrid regime.”9  As George concludes, Jordan never aimed for a transition 
from authoritarian rule to democracy because neither the monarchy nor the Jordanians 
really seek democracy.  He argues that Jordan’s establishment has sought to maintain its 
privileges while signaling their willingness for reforms, however, predominantly in the 
economic sector.  Moreover, most Jordanians do not trust political representation.  
Family and tribal ties, as well as social justice, individual security, and accountability of 
the state, are more important than normative principles of western democracies.  Many 
Jordanians prefer the status quo in Jordan in light of its hostile neighborhood and 
authoritarian rule in Syria or Saudi Arabia.10 
                                                 
9 Schirin Fathi, "Jordanian Survival Strategy: The Election Law as a 'Safety Valve'," Middle Eastern 
Studies 41, no. 6 (2005): 889; Curtis Ryan and Jillian Schwedler, "Return to democratization or new hybrid 
Regime?: The 2003 Elections in Jordan," Middle East Policy 11, no. 2 (2004): 149; Scott Greenwood, 
"Jordan's "New Bargain:" the Political Economy of Regime Security," The Middle East Journal 57, no. 2 
(2003): 251; Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents and 
Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 105; Robinson, Defensive Democratization in 
Jordan, 387–388; Ellen Lust-Okar and Saloua Zerhouni, Political Participation in the Middle East 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 301; Francesco Cavatorta and Azzam Elananza, "Political 
Opposition in Civil Society: An Analysis of the Interactions of Secular and Religious Associations in 
Algeria and Jordan," Government and Opposition 43, no. 4 (2008): 570; Russell Lucas, Institutions and the 
Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges, 1988-2001 (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2005), 137–144. 
10 George, Jordan: Living in the Crossfire, 242–243. 
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Baylouny offers further explanations of this lack of interest in democracy, 
highlighting the role of the military in securing patrimonial ties between the monarchy 
and the Transjordan population.  She shows that the military has grown in importance as 
a major employer with regard to social welfare and economic affairs.  As George does, 
Baylouny argues, “seemingly successful economic and political reforms have been used 
to advertise the American vision of societal transformation in the Middle East.”11 
As Jordan’s macroeconomic conditions improved, scholars focused on the 
emerging business elites in Jordan under King Abdullah II.  With reference to a World 
Bank Study on twenty countries in the Middle East in 2009, Jordan was assessed as the 
country which conducted the highest number of economic reforms.12  In this light, 
business elites were promoted to the inner circles of the King.  This new elite recognizes 
that liberalization favors Islamist organizations, which makes them less likely to initiate 
democratic reforms from above.13 
Bellin and Wiktorowicz show that the mukharabat (security service) and 
bureaucratic regulations of civil society organizations are major hindrances to democratic 
progress.  Wiktorowicz shows that such control has led to the rise of radical Islamist 
organizations that aim to defy state control despite a sophisticated Jordanian security 
apparatus.  He points to the importance of informal social networks of Salafi 
                                                 
11 Anne Marie Baylouny, "Militarizing Welfare: Neo-Liberalism and Jordanian Policy," The Middle 
East Journal 62, no. 2 (2008): 277, 281–293, 298–299. 
12 World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, "Doing Business in the Arab World 2010: 
Comparing Regulations in 20 Countries," The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / 
The World Bank, http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/FullReport/2010/DB10_ArabWorld.pdf 
(accessed February 12, 2010). 
13 André Bank and Oliver Schlumberger, "Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform," 
in Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change, ed. Volker Perthes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2004), 46, 54–56; Greenwood, Jordan's "New Bargain:" the Political Economy of Regime Security, 248; 
Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan," 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 25, no. 1 (1992): 75; Giacomo Luciani, "Economic and Political 
Reform in the Middle East," in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in 
Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 174. 
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organizations and their implications on politics and society in Jordan.14  Further, with 
regard to social-welfare networks, Clark’s study of Jordan shows that networks have 
expanded in the private realm and between Islamists and non-Islamists.  She argues that 
care by Islamic Social Institutions has strengthened horizontal ties among the educated 
and marginalized middle class, while the poor had to seek additional aid elsewhere as 
they could not afford the costs of social care raised by these institutions.15 
Collectively, the literature on Jordan’s “hybrid regime” highlights the regime’s 
success in maintaining the status quo and Jordan’s democratic façade.  Nevertheless, one 
conclusion from all these studies suggests that democratic exclusion does not put an end 
to Islamist activism, but instead shifts it toward informal—and perhaps clandestine—
organizing that circumvents state control.  Islamist movements became the remaining 
legitimate opposition to the regime while radical strands might gain in importance.  
Therefore, it is important to analyze the dynamics between the regime and Islamist 
movements and the factors that shape their behavior, as well as the prospects of 
moderation by political inclusion as the literature in the next section debates. 
2. Moderation of Political Islam 
The absence of democracy on the one hand and the rise of Islamist movements in 
the Middle East on the other hand have led to a wide spectrum of literature that deals 
with the emergence and role of political Islam in Middle Eastern societies.  Whereas one 
camp of scholars points to the cultural dimension of Islam as an obstacle to modernity 
and democracy, the other camp argues that Islam is not hostile to the modern world and 
incorporates democratic elements.  Since the literature of neither camp elaborates on the  
 
 
                                                 
14 Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan," Comparative 
Politics 33, no. 1 (2000): 57–58; Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: 
Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 143; Quintan 
Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in 
Jordan (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 205. 
15 Janine Clark, "Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions and the 
Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen," Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 8 (2004): 112–114. 
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political context Islamists operate in, the reviewed debate in the literature focuses on 
social movement theory, which aims to explain the behavior of Islamist movements in 
certain political and socio-economic contexts.16 
Berman’s approach to political Islam uses analogies from the political 
developments in Europe of the early twentieth century, which were characterized by 
political instability.  Her approach offers different perspectives on the “inclusion-
moderation theory:” (1) Parties become moderate in order to attract the bulk of voters in 
the middle of the political spectrum (Anthony Downs’ median-voter theory).  (2) Political 
parties need to create a bureaucracy, which draws resources from the organization.  
While they are included in a competitive political environment, they focus on pragmatic 
solutions to organize and run the organization (Robert Michel).  (3) As parties are 
confronted with the needs of the daily life of the people and take over political 
responsibility they become pragmatic and distance themselves from former radical 
ideas.17 
Moaddel supports Berman’s argument showing that Jordan’s Islamists became 
more moderate and pragmatic by legally competing with other political parties.  With 
reference to Jordan’s authoritarian pluralism, and in contrast to ideological driven 
regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iran, the MB in Jordan was not politicized as their 
counterparts and, therefore, able to moderate their ideology.  The Jordanian regime never 
fought the religious basis of Islamist organizations.  Munson points to the capability of 
                                                 
16 See debates in the following literature: Lisa Anderson, "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique 
of the Political Cultural Approach," in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: 
Theoretical Perspectives, eds. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, vol. 1 (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995), 77–92; Larry Diamond, Islam and Democracy in the Middle East (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 322; John L. Esposito and Francois Burgat, Modernizing Islam: 
Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University 
Press, 2003), 278; John L. Esposito and John Obert Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 232; and Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 235. 
17 Sheri Berman, "Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe," Journal of Democracy 19 (2008): 
6, 16–17. 
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the MB in Egypt to absorb repression by its structure and social network.18  El-Ghobashy 
argues that the “metamorphosis” of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers derives from their 
survival strategy.  Against the exclusion of moderate Islamists from political 
participation, political inclusion is without alternative since they are the only legitimate 
political force in Egypt.  However, moderation in a highly diverse political spectrum is 
supposed to fail without strong democratic institutions in place.19 
Boulby explores the relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and the MB in 
different periods.  She argues that the MB in Jordan, in contrast to its counterpart in 
Egypt, shows a “lack of intellectual engagement as well as the limited Islamic theoretical 
legacy on the formation of the state.”  Nevertheless, the MB in Egypt, as well as the MB 
in Jordan, has remained politically ambiguous.  However, the Egyptian heritage of an 
Islamic reformist movement against British colonial rule in the nineteenth century and the 
exclusive and repressive political context in Egypt differ from the case of Jordan 
significantly.  The relationship between the monarchy and the MB is based on common 
interests against common threats, such as Arab-nationalism or radical Islamism, which 
enhances the alignment between the Hashemite regime and the MB through turbulent 
political changes.20 
In addition, Robinson argues that moderate Islamists in Jordan proved to follow to 
democratic rules as they push for more liberalization.  More democracy is in the interest 
of the Islamist movement as it protects it from further repression, but stands in contrast to 
the regime’s interests.  In contrast to Boulby, Robinson argues that the Muslim Brothers’ 
special relationship with the Hashemite regime is clearly over along with Jordan’s 
reconciliation with Israel and increasing repression since the mid-1990s.21  Adams adds 
                                                 
18 Mansoor Moaddel, Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Analysis of State-Religion 
Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 4–5, 145–146; Ziad 
Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," 
Sociological Quarterly Berkeley 42, no. 4 (2001): 487. 
19 Mona El-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers," International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 37 (2005): 391. 
20 Marion Boulby and John Obert Voll, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993, 
Vol. 18 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999), 169. 
21 Glenn E. Robinson, "Can Islamists be Democrats? The Case of Jordan," The Middle East Journal 
51, no. 3 (1997): 386–387. 
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that the MB in Jordan was not successful in achieving its political ends, but profited from 
political liberalization as it became the largest political opposition in parliament.22  As 
Adams does, Freij points to the regime’s tactics of using the MB as a political instrument 
according to commonalities of political interests.  However, the weakness of the Islamist 
political front derives from the factions within the MB with regard to interests of the 
Palestine and Transjordan constituencies as well as independent Islamists.23  Kaye and 
others point out the danger of a re-radicalization with reference to the decreasing political 
influence of the MB and a new relationship between the monarchy and the MB.24 
Denoeux supports the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis” in his cross-national 
study of moderate and radical Islamists in the Middle East.  He argues that the regimes’ 
policy between cooperation and confrontation has strong implications on the agendas of 
Islamist organizations.  As a strict line between moderate and radical Islamist does not 
exist, different factions occur in certain ideological issues.  He concludes that government 
policy should seek opportunities of political cooperation in order to contain radical 
Islamists.  However, Denoeux argues, according to a weak empirical basis, that the 
scenario of formerly moderate Islamists becoming more radical after having seized power 
cannot be ruled out.25  In addition, Brumberg insists that liberalized autocracies face a 
trap.  On the one hand, autocrats are more capable of containing Islamists in a politically 
diverse realm; on the other hand, limited inclusion can result in a zero-sum, which leads 
to a radicalization of Islamist organizations.26  Herb adds that inclusion of Islamist 
organizations has not paid off to the extent that it has established “hybrid regimes” rather 
than challenging the autocrat’s power.  It entrenched the cleavages between liberal 
                                                 
22 Linda Adams, "Political Liberalization in Jordan: An Analysis of the State's Relationship with the 
Muslim Brotherhood," Journal of Church and State 38, no. 3 (1996): 526–528. 
23 Hanna Y. Freij, "Liberalization, the Islamists, and the Stability of the Arab State: Jordan as a Case 
Study," The Muslim World 86, no. 1 (1996): 25–29. 
24 Kaye et al., More Freedom, Less Terror?: Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World, 
77. 
25 Denoeux, The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam, 78–80. 
26 Michael Herb, "Emirs and Parliament in the Gulf," in Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, eds. 
Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Daniel Brumberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 
84–90. 
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tensions and authoritarian rule.27  Thus, the dynamic between inclusion and moderation 
has many facets, which might lead to unintended consequences.  Consequently, inclusion 
of moderate Islamists has to be considered case by case. 
Clark challenges the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis” while analyzing the role 
of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in the Higher Committee for the Coordination of 
National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) in Jordan.  She argues that political cooperation 
has its limits with regard to ideological “red-lines” of the IAF.  She concludes that 
political cooperation with the IAF occurred regarding democratic procedures rather than 
substance.28 
Schwedler analyzes the spectrum of Islamists in Jordan.  She argues that the MB 
has played a key role in Jordan’s political development and will contribute to democratic 
progress if the regime imposes political reforms.  She also challenges the “inclusion-
moderation hypothesis” as it did not answer different developments of co-opted parties in 
Jordan (Islamic Action Front) and in Yemen (Islah).  Schwedler shows that moderation 
takes place when “limited political openings restructure public political space, even when 
transition processes seem to have stalled.”29  She identifies three reasons for the IAF’s 
success: (1) the IAF did not directly threaten the regime's legitimacy in public; (2) 
discipline prevented factionalism within the party; and (3) the IAF justified political 
cooptation according to Islamic values.30 
Since key ideologues of political Islam and their organizations were shaped under 
western colonial and Arab authoritarian rule, scholars focus on the socio-economic and 
                                                 
27 William Quandt, "Algeria's Uneasy Peace," in Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, eds. Larry 
Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Daniel Brumberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 58–
66; Herb, Emirs and Parliament in the Gulf, 84–90. 
28 Janine Clark, "The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in 
Jordan," International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 4 (2006): 555–556. 
29 Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 77. 
30 Ibid., 172, 198–205. 
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political context in which Islamists operate.31  Hafez’s political process approach to the 
circumstances of the devastating violence during the civil war in Algeria shed light on the 
relationship between harsh repression of the Islamist movement spearheaded by the Front 
Islamique du Salut (FIS) and the anti-civilian massacres committed by militant Islamists 
of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA).  Not only the brutality of the regime’s repression, 
but the way in which it fostered the “spirals of encapsulation” fueled the radicalization of 
Islamists and created a vicious circle of violence.32  Hafez and Wiktorowicz’s research 
on the Egyptian Islamic movement and the violence in the 1990s showed that relative 
deprivation could not sufficiently explain the emerging violence.  As well as in the case 
of Algeria, the Islamist movement in Egypt was able to accumulate resources and expand 
their networks before the regime’s countermeasure were effective.  They argue that 
repertoires of violence were also used by “moderate” strands in Egypt since 
indiscriminate repression posed a threat to the existence of the Islamist movement.33 
The reviewed literature does not provide a clear-cut approach to the question of 
whether inclusion of moderate Islamists in the political process bodes well for the 
political development in Jordan.  The camp, which criticizes the “inclusion-moderation 
hypothesis,” is growing, not in the least due to evidence for successful political inclusion 
of Islamist organizations falls short.  Based on the consensus of this literature that 
Islamist organizations act rationally, the motives and the driving factors of their behavior 
are of main concern, since they could lead to radicalization, continuity (no change in 
behavior), or moderation as the political process approach states.  Thus, instead on  
 
                                                 
31 Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, 
2008); Vali Reza Nasr, "Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami," in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed. Alī 
Rāhnamā (London; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books, 2006), 98; Vali Reza Nasr, "The Rise of the 
"Muslim Democracy"," Journal of Democracy 16, no. 2 (2005): 18–25; David Commins, "Hasan Al-
Banna," in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed. Alī Rāhnamā (London; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 
2006), 125. 
32 Mohammed M. Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process of GIA Violence in 
Algeria," in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 53. 
33 Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic 
Movement," in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 80. 
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focusing on the question of moderation, the rationales of strategic behavior of Islamist 
organizations, which operate in a certain political and socio-economic context, have to be 
explored. 
In addition to this debate in the literature, demographic shifts in the Middle East 
and in Jordan, along with economic development and modernization including the 
globalization of media, makes it increasingly difficult for regimes to deny the youth and 
emergent middle classes genuine opportunities for political participation.  Islamism 
attracts the aspiring middle class professionals (e.g., engineers, doctors, etc.) in large part 
because the existing political order shuts them out, while Islamism offers them a vision of 
a just political order. 
Finally, Islamism is a political force that garners mass support.  Denying these 
constituencies a genuine voice in their political affairs opens up the space for radicalism, 
even if this radicalism remains at the level of ideological rejection of the regime and its 
Western allies.  As the Iranian revolution shows, should these Islamist forces come to 
power through revolutionary means they will certainly take a negative attitude toward the 
U.S. and the West more generally.  Thus, a managed transition to democracy where 
Islamists are invited responsibly into the process offers the U.S. and the EU an 
opportunity to enhance its standing with the dominant opposition.  Needless to say, anti-
Americanism in the Middle East is driven by widely-held belief that Western rhetoric of 
freedom, liberty and democracy is not matched by Western actions, which invariably side 
with autocrats.  Consequently, given that the Jordanian Muslim Brothers have a long 
history of pragmatism and moderation, they are ideal candidates to incorporate in a 
democratic political process. 
Collectively, despite Western uncertainty about the real aims of the MB in Jordan, 
the status quo in Jordan might be more risky for peace and stability than political change 
in Jordan that favors the substantial political inclusion of the MB.  The next section 
highlights the variety of strategies to promote democratic transitions.  While there is no 
consensus in the literature on how to proceed, there is general agreement that 
international actors can aid or hinder the process. 
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3. U.S. and EU Assistance 
The assistance of the U.S. and the EU to Jordan aims to support a stable 
development that enables further liberalization and democratization.  Carothers identifies 
three different target areas of assistance: (1) political process, (2) governing institutions, 
and (3) civil society.34  There is consensus in the literature that a universal approach does 
not exist.35  In addition, the understanding that U.S. and EU assistance needs both “top-
down” and “bottom-up” approaches prevails in the literature.36  With reference to the aim 
of this thesis, the literature discusses the limits and the chances of U.S. and EU assistance 
to the Middle East, in general, and to Jordan, in particular, focusing on the role of 
Islamist organizations. 
Wittes argues that there is no alternative to the promotion of democracy to 
prevent radical Islamists from gaining power.  She sees a commonality of strategic 
interests between the U.S. and its autocratic allies.37  In contrast to Wittes, Ottaway and 
Carothers challenge the school of thought that terrorism can only be fought by promoting 
democracy.  They point to the different historic experiences in Europe, such as in the 
cases of the Basque separatists (ETA) in Spain and the Irish Republican Army in 
Ireland.38  Moreover, Piazza’s cross-regional quantitative research in the Middle East 
shows that more liberal Middle Eastern states are more vulnerable to terrorism than their 
more authoritarian counterparts.39  In addition, Kaye and others argue on the basis of 
their cross-national study in the Middle East that a pragmatic approach of democracy 
promotion including moderate Islamist organizations is needed.  However, they note that 
                                                 
34 Thomas Carothers, "Taking Stock of US Democracy Assistance," in American Democracy 
Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, eds. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 189. 
35 Michael McFaul, "Democracy Promotion as a World Value," The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1 
(Winter, 2004): 160–161. 
36 Carothers, Taking Stock of US Democracy Assistance, 199. 
37 Tamara Cofman Wittes, Freedom's Unsteady March (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2008), 146–151. 
38 Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, "Middle East Democracy," Foreign Policy, no. 145 (2004): 
28. 
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Middle Eastern Countries," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 6 (June, 2007): 536. 
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inclusion of Islamist organizations has failed when political participation did not pay.40  
Thus, Fuller is cautiously optimistic about trends of moderation in Islamist organizations.  
He argues that political Islam is doomed due to harsh repression by regimes and the 
missing pressure of the U.S. and EU on authoritarian regimes for democratic progress.41 
Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso insist that a weak civil society is the major obstacle 
for the democratization process in many countries of the Middle East.  They argue that as 
Islamist parties play the major role in social and political realms, Western approaches 
have to put pressure on the regimes to give space for the development of civil society.  In 
the case of Jordan, reforms have to focus on “expanding legislative powers, adopting new 
press legislation, decreasing regulations on non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
and undertaking electoral system reform.”  They conclude, “paradigm shifts” are likely to 
emerge by political “shocks” rather than by democratic promotion.42 
Scholars studying the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) highlight the 
chances of the EU to assist democratization with regard to its wide spectrum of 
capabilities, but criticize its reluctance to push for reforms.43  In this context, Youngs 
argues that the EU’s comprehensive approach to a safer EU neighborhood is remarkable 
as it significantly differs from U.S. and NATO initiatives.  Nevertheless, he insists that 
the EU has to expand its approach to the Middle East to create a coherent approach to the 
region including challenges in Iraq and Palestine.  Therefore, the EU’s approach to the 
Middle East has to go beyond its near neighborhood to address sources of instability in 
                                                 
40 Kaye et al., More Freedom, Less Terror?: Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World, 
163–176; see also Hafez Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the 
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the region and security threats to Europe.44  With regard to the French initiative in 2008 
to revitalize the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) by the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM), Kausch and Youngs argue that European national interests have 
prevailed over a comprehensive approach to the Middle East.  The U.S. and other rising 
powers in the region have to be addressed by the EU approach to the Middle East.  
Moreover, as security comes first, the efforts in promoting human rights, good 
governance, and democracy fall short, while the role of Islamist organizations is 
ignored.45  In addition, Haukkala questions the normative power of the EU since it does 
not attract the Middle East.  He criticizes missing concrete incentives in conjunction with 
clear conditions to push for democratic progress in a top-down approach.46 
Shahin’s study on the Egyptian reform process shows that U.S. and EU assistance 
were inconsistent.  Political alternatives to the regime were missing since the opposition 
was weak and fragmented.47  In this context, Resende and Kraetzschmar’s research on 
the role of parties in Egypt highlights the importance of EU assistance to foster a 
pluralistic competitive political realm, which facilitates inclusion of Islamist 
organizations.48  However, the real world looks different.  Neither the U.S. nor the EU 
was able or willing to push the Egyptian regime for political reforms that favor the 
inclusion of Islamist organizations.  In research on trends of political Islam in Egypt, El 
Houdaiby advocates that Europe should make its difference from U.S. policy clear since 
Islamists are more skeptical about the U.S. than the EU.  Besides a top-down approach, 
the EU should seek direct cooperation on the party-level and with NGOs.  El Houdaiby 
                                                 
44 Richard Youngs, "European Approaches to Security in the Mediterranean," The Middle East 
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argues, therefore, that the selection of actors on the grass-roots level and clear criteria for 
an EU engagement focused on the political process is decisive.  In addition, cultural 
exchange between the EU and Islamists will create a basis of trust between both sides.49 
Tocci’s case study on the ENP in Palestine shows only limited success of EU 
assistance.  Whereas the EU could have expanded its influence in Palestine via its support 
for the Palestinian Authority, it failed to claim concrete conditions for assistance, along 
with a missing coordination of its efforts.  She argues that EU assistance also failed to 
bridge the trenches between secular and Islamist forces in Palestine.50  Nevertheless, 
Tocci and Mikhelizde add that EU engagement should foster political inclusion, as 
positive examples of inclusion of former radical organizations in Europe have shown.51 
Emmerson, Youngs, and Springborg conclude, referring to a cross-national study 
on political Islam in the Middle East and the ENP, that moderate Islamists generally 
embraced EU rather than U.S. assistance.  However, Islamists were concerned about 
drawbacks regarding repression, political competition, and popularity.  Thus, Springborg 
argues that the EU has to define its’ goals and how it wants to engage with political 
Islam.  He advocates a pragmatic approach in order to address democratic challenges, 
which are not objectionable to religious beliefs.  Finally, the EU should strengthen 
political institutions and their acceptance by society since most people are more 
interested in patrimonial relationships than in political representation.52  In later research 
on Islamist radicalization in the Middle East, Springborg adds that European approaches 
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to states in the Middle East have not prevented a trend towards radicalization since 
repression by regimes has continued and the political influence of moderate Islamists has 
declined significantly alongside an increasing apolitical society.  But, he argues, the real 
threat derives from co-opted Islamists who might become strategic partners of autocrats 
while political alternatives are missing: “Authoritarianism is bad enough, but Islamist 
authoritarianism would be even worse…”53  Thus, Asseburg highlights that the European 
paradigm of Middle Eastern engagement has shifted since “moderate Islamists should no 
longer be excluded from measures aimed at democracy promotion.”  Asseburg concludes 
that legislation, strengthening political parties, and fostering the political process and free 
and fair elections should be the EU’s main concern.54 
Consequently, the reviewed literature does not provide a consensus on U.S. and 
EU assistance to the Middle East in light of the resurgence of Islam and terrorism.  Along 
with the contentious issues of the previous section with regard to moderation of political 
Islam, the question whether the West should push autocratic regimes for political 
liberalization remains under debate.  Whereas one camp insists that democracy promotion 
might create more harm than good and threatens the security of the region, the other 
camp advocates that the U.S. and the EU should push authoritarian regimes for more 
political liberalization and the inclusion of moderate Islamists.  Nevertheless, the latter 
camp highlights the benefits of the EU approach in some cases with regard to its civilian 
capabilities and its positive reputation in the public on the one hand, but questions the 
willingness and effectiveness of the EU in the region to push for more political reforms.  
However, there is a consensus that neither the U.S. nor the EU has developed a clear 
approach of how to respond to moderate Islamist organizations in the Middle East. 
Finally, the reviewed debates show the wide spectrum of literature related to this 
thesis.  However, it also shows that a straightforward approach to foster a democratic and 
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stable environment in Jordan and including Islamist organizations in the political process 
does not exist.  The literature lacks a comprehensive approach to analyze the intersection 
between regime policy, the strategic behavior of Islamist organizations in Jordan, and the 
effects of assistance by major foreign actors such as the U.S. and the EU to Jordan in a 
context, which is shaped by political and socioeconomic factors. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis addresses the research questions in a three-step approach.  First, the 
political opportunities of Islamist organizations in Jordan are explored.  In this context, 
the policy of the Jordanian regime against the background of political and socio-
economic factors in Jordan is examined.  Therefore, the first step draws from social 
movement theory focusing on the political process approach to explore the dynamic 
between political opportunities and the behavior of Islamist organizations in Jordan.  
Instead of ideological framing and mobilizing structures of the political process approach, 
this approach highlights ideational and organizational motives of Islamist organization’s 
behavior. 
Whereas the approach of the first step focuses on the entire Islamist spectrum, the 
second step explores the MB’s strategic behavior.  Since the strategic behavior of Islamist 
organizations is of main concern, as it explains their development in a spectrum between 
radicalization and moderation, this approach focuses on the question whether political 
inclusion of the MB bodes well for Jordan’s polity.  Beyond the “inclusion-moderation 
hypothesis,” this approach explores the rational choice of the MB in response to changing 
political opportunities, as elaborated in the first step, focusing on considerations 
regarding costs and benefits from an organizational and ideological point of view.  In this 
context, action, decisions, and political agendas are assessed. 
Third, the underlying rationales and strategies of U.S. and EU assistance are 
explored and compared.  With reference to the previous two steps, the effects of U.S. and 
EU assistance on political opportunities and their responsiveness to moderate Islamist 
organizations such as the MB are examined.  This approach highlights the realist and 
liberal school of thought as competing families of theories in international relations. 
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Finally, main primary sources are derived from the Center of Strategic Studies at 
the University of Jordan, the United Nations, as well as publications by U.S. 
administrations and the European Union. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In accordance with the depicted methods and sources, this thesis is organized into 
three main chapters and one concluding chapter. 
Chapter II explores political opportunities of Islamist organizations in Jordan and 
the Islamist spectrum in which the MB operates.  Since political opportunities are 
suppose to emerge predominantly top-down, the role of the Jordanian regime and its 
means to maintain the status quo will be highlighted.  In addition, political opportunities 
will be examined with regard to socio-economic factors and public trends in Jordan.  The 
importance of the MB with regard to its network and ideology in comparison to 
competing Islamist organizations is assessed to provide the basis for Chapter III. 
Chapter III draws from the development of the MB’s special relationship with the 
Jordanian regime in order to explore the MB’s strategic behavior and the chances of 
moderation by political inclusion.  This chapter takes into account rationales of 
moderation, political agendas, and the recent development in the light of the 2007 
elections while focusing on the reign of King Abdullah II since 1999. 
Chapter IV examines U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan to explain common and 
different strategic interests and strategic cultures as well as the effects of their concepts 
and means on political opportunities in Jordan reflecting the conclusions of Chapter II 
and III.  In this context, the U.S. and EU responsiveness to moderate Islamist 
organizations in Jordan is explored. 
Finally, Chapter V summarizes the findings of this thesis and recommends a 
rethinking of U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan. 
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II. ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN 
This chapter examines the factors that shape strategic behavior of Islamist 
movements and frame the prospects of liberalization in Jordan.  Islamist movements are 
treated as rational unitary actors with preferences based on cost-benefit rationales, 
organizational capabilities, and ideologies.  This approach raises the following questions: 
(1) What are the factors that shape strategies of Islamist movements in Jordan?  (2) How 
might these movements change the prospects of political liberalization in Jordan? 
Social movement theory explains the emergence and development of Islamist 
movements in different regime types.  Based on research on social movements 
predominantly in the western world, scholars have developed a “political process 
approach” (e.g., McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1998; and Tilly, 
1978/1995), which focuses on political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and 
ideological frames.  This approach acknowledges that grievances according to the theory 
of “relative deprivation” and resources according to the theory of “resource mobilization” 
matter.  However, neither grievances nor resources will cause mobilization if political 
opportunities do not occur.55  While mobilizing structure provides the necessary material 
and organizational resources, framing processes are necessary to create just cause based 
on perceived or created injustice.  These processes are necessary to create a movement’s 
identity, which is crucial for a movement’s cohesion and its momentum.56  In accordance 
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with the “political process approach,” recent research on social movements in the Middle 
East (e.g., Hafez, 2003; Munson, 2001; Wickham, 2002; and Wiktorowicz, 2004) has 
provided the most comprehensive explanation for the emergence and development of 








Figure 1.   Political Opportunities (*), Ideologies, and Organizational Structures that 
Shape the Behavior of Islamist Movements 
However, the political process approach does not exhaustively apply to the 
explanation of strategic behavior of Islamist movements in Jordan.  Whereas political 
opportunities are supposed to alter a movement’s cost-benefit rationales, mobilizing 
structures and ideological frames focus on mobilization rather than on strategic choice.  
Thus, in place of mobilizing structures, this chapter focuses on how organizational 
structures and networks influence a movement’s behavior and its prospects to achieve its 
ends.  In order to explore strategic choice of a movement, the dynamics between the 
variables in Figure 1, and how they shape the underlying rationales of a movement’s 
decision, are of importance.  Political opportunities might provide benefits for 
organizational structures with regard to new resources or might threaten the 
organizational autonomy and its resources.  Access to the political decision-making 
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process and alliances with influential elites might benefit organizational structures and 
outweigh the costs of ideological concessions, which can threaten a movement’s support 
or even cause splintering of factions from a movement.58 
Furthermore, in place of ideological frames of the political process approach, this 
chapter examines the relationship between political opportunities and ideologies.  A 
movement might engage in politics by playing by the rules of the regime if its ideology 
resonates with emerging political opportunities.  By contrast, a movement might reject 
political opportunities since its ideology refuses an accommodation with the regime.  
Repression might not necessarily lead to a radicalization of an organization’s ideology if 
the benefits of an accommodative stance outweigh the costs of confrontation with the 
regime.  Trends and shifts in public opinion shape a movement’s ideological and 
organizational response.  A movement is supposed to adapt its ideology in order to attract 
public support and enhance recruitment if its ideology is open for interpretation.  Vice 
versa, a rigid ideology remains exclusive and less able to attract the bulk of public 
opinion.  Nevertheless, this exclusiveness might be necessary for a movement’s identity 
to distinguish itself from “co-opted” mainstream movements.59 
Collectively, this approach to explore the strategic behavior of Islamists and the 
prospects for liberalization in Jordan focuses on political opportunities and the 
responsiveness of organizational structures and ideologies of Islamist movements to 
windows of opportunity for political change, as well as the dynamics between these 
variables. 
Consequently, the first section provides an overview about Islamist strands in 
Jordan and explores how ideologies and organizational structures of Islamist movements 
resonate with political opportunities.  This section highlights that moderate Islamist 
movements behave according to strategic decisions in order to play by the rules of the 
regime.  The MB is the most powerful Islamist movement from an organizational and 
ideological point of view.  Its identity is inclusive as its pragmatic approach offers 
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opportunities for interpretations in response to political opportunities.  The MB is the 
only opposition movement that is able to bridge rifts within Jordan’s identity and public 
opinion and to attract a majority of the population in order to take over political 
responsibility.  Nevertheless, bedsides the MB, its “natural ally” Hamas, and radical 
strands such as Salafism, have grown in importance and influence the MB strategic 
choice.  However, jihadi Salafism remains exclusive.  It will not win the Jordanian hearts 
and minds. 
The second section elaborates on political opportunities that shape the strategic 
behavior of Islamist movements, which derive from changes of political access, 
variations of state repression, and divisions among elites and influential allies as well as 
from shifts of public opinion (see Figure 1).  It shows that political opportunities are not 
likely to emerge.  Political access remains limited for Islamist movements to challenge 
the power of the regime and to take over political responsibility.  The regime’s repression 
is not blunt but it effectively controls the social realm.  It varies in accordance with major 
domestic and foreign security threats by a wide spectrum of bureaucratic regulations that 
limit civil liberties.  Divisions among elites and influential alliance did not occur since 
the King was able to reshuffle the elite structures effectively.  Lastly, Jordan’s public 
opinion has not experienced major rifts recently.  Nevertheless, it is divided by increasing 
clientelism and by its political stance with regard to a future political system in Jordan.  
Windows of opportunity might open as the regime retreats from the social realm, which 
undermines the regime’s legitimacy in the long run. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND IDEOLOGIES 
The spectrum of Islamist movements in Jordan is manifold as Figure 2 shows.  
Moderate strands, such as the MB or the Islamic Center Party, are willing to play by the 
rules of the regime and call for political participation since they believe in accordance 
with Islamic law that this is the most appropriate way to achieve their ends.  
Nevertheless, the responsiveness of moderate strands to political opportunities differs 
depending on internal factions and their networks.  The MB is the only movement that 
could effectively exploit political opportunities.  By contrast, the responsiveness of 
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radical strands to political opportunities is low from an ideological and organizational 
point of view.  It varies between movements, which reject the democratic framework or 
political participation whereas the jihadi Salafist movement fights against the regime to 
achieve their ends.  Networks of radical strands have gained in strength, but they are 
limited regarding organizational structures and resources since countermeasures of the 







Figure 2.   Islamist Organizations in Jordan 
Despite the diversity of the Islamist spectrum, all strands share common 
ideological roots.60  The resurgence of a reformist strand of Salafism in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries under British colonial rule inspired key ideologues of today’s 
Islamist strands such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb of the MB in Egypt and Syed 
Abul A'ala Mawdudi of the Jama’at-i-Islami in Pakistan.61  However, ideologies have 
developed in different ways depending on the socio-economic and political context. 
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The plurality of Jordan’s Islamist strands stem from the MB, which is the most 
influential moderate Islamist organization in the Middle East.62  Hasan al-Banna founded 
the MB in Egypt in 1928 whose philosophy of political Islam still inspires today’s 
Islamic organizations.  Hasan al-Banna believed that the decay of Muslim values in 
society was the major reason for Muslim backwardness in comparison to western 
modernity.  After society has returned to true Islam, an Islamic state under the rule of the 
Shari’ah will be achieved by focusing on education to foster adherence to true Islam and 
to strengthen the community of believers.63  Al-Banna created a network consisting of 
usrahs (“family” cells), public and religious institutions providing the message of Islam 
(da’wa), but did not create a political master plan of a transition to an Islamic order.  
Moreover, he lacked intellectual vigor since pragmatism has been the major 
determinant.64 
Al-Banna and Mawdudi believed in the unity of religion and politics in 
accordance with the oneness of God (tawhid) in the tradition of Taqi al-din ibn 
Taymiyyah, a leading scholar of the Hanbali jurisprudence.  Mawdudi expanded 
Taymiyyah’s concept of jahiliyya to autocratic Muslim rule in order to demonstrate the 
illegitimacy of rulers in Muslim countries and justify jihad against them.  Nevertheless, 
al-Banna and Mawdudi advocated a gradual approach to transforming the state as the 
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most effective course of action.  Therefore, they rejected jihad, not because of ideological 
reasons, but because of rational action and pragmatism.65 
Sayyid Qutb, key ideologue of the MB in Egypt in the 1950/60s, suffered as many 
members of the MB under harsh repression and torture by the Egyptian regime.  A 
gradual approach as proposed by al-Banna and Mawdudi did not pay off and became 
impossible under the new Nasser regime.  Consequently, Qutb advocated a far more rigid 
ideology.  He argued that a society living in ignorance of God (jahiliyya) and under a kufr 
regime (regime of unbelief), which rejects the sovereignty of god (hakimmiyyat), has to 
be reshaped by a vanguard of true believers.  According to Qutb, takfir 
(excommunication) became a means to bypass fitna (fighting Muslims is forbidden) and 
to blemish Muslim “collaborators” as unbelievers.  These infidels had to be fought by 
jihad as an obligation of every Muslim (“sixth pillar of Islam”).66  Needless to say, 
Qutb’s ideology opened the door for radical Islamist strands.  While the MB distanced 
itself from Qutb’s ideas in the 1960s under Al-Hudabi, violent Islamist strands have 
drawn from Qutb’s ideology to legitimatize their actions since then.67 
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1. Moderate Strands 
Moderate Islamists are willing to change a political situation by obeying the rules 
of the regime.  Social and religious activism as well as political participation stands for a 
reformist approach of political Islam.68  In this spirit, Abu Qurah, a wealthy merchant, 
founded the MB in Jordan in 1945 in Amman as a branch of the Egyptian MB.  His 
primary goal was to support the Palestinian resistance against a growing Israeli 
predominance.69  The ideology of Hasan al-Banna provided the blueprint for the MB’s 
agenda and its structures.  Its primary constituency derived from educated (becoming) 
professionals of established Transjordan families, and later predominantly Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin.70  Non-violent action and political competition supported by a strong 
social basis should lead to Islamic order based on Shari’ah.71  However, as noted, the 
MB did not create a detailed political agenda for a transition to Islamic order.72 
In addition, the MB in Jordan is not a monolithic bloc and the frontlines between 
“hawks” and “doves” are not linear.73  The MB incorporates moderate and radical 
ideologies since different factions in the MB have existed, but mainly adheres to the 
school of Hasan al-Banna.  The “weight distribution” between radical and moderate 
ideologies of the MB is supposed to shift in dependence on political opportunities.  Thus, 
if political opportunities (especially political access) emerge, the MB might follow the 
moderate wing while the radical wing splinters from the movement.74 
The Islamic Center of Charity and Society (ICCS), founded in 1963 to support 
and administer the MB’s charity activities, became the largest and financially most 
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powerful NGO in Jordan.75  The young, well-educated middle class constituency of the 
MB spread out in universities and professional associations and repelled the leftists from 
their strongholds.  In addition, the MB gained access to the Ministry of Education and 
was able to influence school teaching beyond the elementary level.76  In contrast to 
Egypt, mosques stayed under control of the government as the demands by a growing 
religious population in the 1980s could be met by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
which had also been infiltrated by the MB.  The MB’s network controlled the social 
centers in many communities.77  Thus, when the remittances from the Gulf States 
skyrocketed in the 1970s, the MB’s network became the crucial source for resources, 
recruitment, and collective action with regard to social and political affairs. 
Moreover, the MB was able to achieve its hegemony in the Islamist spectrum as 
the regime cracked down on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on “Black 
September” in 1970.  The monarchy neutralized the MB’s main rival and allowed the MB 
to widen its social networks to fill the vacuum in Palestinian dominated regions in 
Jordan.  The MB’s network even expanded in the private realm between Islamists and 
non-Islamists and strengthened horizontal ties among the middle class.  Finally, the 
success in the 1989 parliamentary elections pushed the expansion of the MB’s 
movement.  However, as Section B will elaborate, the political opening did not last 
long.78 
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After the Political Parties Law was adjusted, the IAF was founded in 1992 as an 
umbrella party of all Islamists officially separated from the MB.  However, the IAF 
became a political actor dominated by the MB, which gave the MB the flexibility to act 
in the political realm, while focusing on its “core business.”  The IAF did not reshape the 
political party system significantly, as the IAF incorporated the MB’s agenda and became 
the political arm of the MB.  Since the IAF is the most successful established Islamist 
political party in Jordan, the MB dominates the Islamist spectrum from a political and 
societal point of view. 
The MB’s ideology of a moderate gradual bottom-up approach incorporates 
various factions and different schools of thought, which allows interpretation of 
ambiguous political goals.  Thus, the MB was able to unify Transjordan and Palestinian 
communities under one “roof,” which accounts for the movement’s success.  The 
ambiguity of the MB’s ends, as the slogan, “Islam is solution,” indicates, is the product of 
limited political access and state repression.  Nevertheless, the ambiguity opens the 
opportunity to frame various grievances to provide a meaning to its members and 
potential supporters. 
However, the support for Islamist movements does not necessarily derive from 
religious motives, but from the opposition to the regime.  The IAF constituency is in 
favor of a more religious approach in politics, which does not necessarily imply the 
implementation of Shari’ah.  In addition, people supported the IAF as its candidates 
seemed to be more educated.79  Consequently, political responsibility and less repression 
are supposed to fuel political disputes within the MB and factionalism.  However, as the 
MB profited from its alignment with regime, the MB will not risk a confrontation with 
the regime as long as the organizational benefits outweigh the costs of political and 
ideological concessions.80 
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The Islamic Center Party is an offshoot of the MB and adheres to the MB’s 
moderate and non-revolutionary approach to achieve its ends.  The Islamic Center Party 
(Hizb al-Wasat al-Islami) is committed to the democratic process, pluralism, and rights of 
women.  Former Transjordan members of the IAF, who joined the IAF in 1992 as did 
many other independent Islamist candidates but rejected the increasing influence of the 
MB and Palestinians within the IAF, established the party in 2001.81  The Islamic Center 
Party emerged in the light of growing factionalism of the MB during the 1990s and 
disputes about political inclusion while the regime’s repression increased.82  Its 
foundation was an attempt to create a political alternative to the MB hegemony.  In 
contrast to the MB’s opposition against the regime’s policy of reconciliation with Israel, 
the Islamic Center Party has accepted the Jordan-Israeli peace treaty as it passed in 
parliament.  However, its initial success in the 2003 elections was short-lived as the party 
lacked support of Palestinian constituencies and a basis of mobilization at the grassroots 
level.  Finally, the Islamic Center Party was perceived as being co-opted by the regime.83  
However, the creation of the Islamic Center Party demonstrates that strategic 
considerations apart from religious motives prevailed.  The Islamic Center Party 
embraces political opportunities but will not profit from change like the MB does, since 
its public resonance and organizational capabilities are weak. 
A similar logic applies for the creation of the Dua’a Party in 1993 as an 
alternative to the MB (formerly “The Arab Islamic Democratic Movement”).  
Nevertheless, its political ideology did not resonate with the public as the party attempted 
to merge Arab-nationalist ideology with Islamic virtues.  The party is committed to 
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democracy and pluralism and advocates an enlightened approach to a modern Islamic 
democracy.  Nevertheless, the Dua’a Party’s social and political influence is low.84 
Lastly, besides moderate Islamist parties, independent Islamist candidates have 
emerged in the political spectrum along with growing clientelism, as Section B will 
show.  The political agendas of independent candidates are not bound to strict ideologies 
and remain ambiguous.  Since their political survival is based on opportunistic rhetoric 
and clientelism, their responsiveness to political opportunities depends on client interests 
but will remain insignificant with regard to political change in Jordan.85 
2. Radical Strands 
Radical strands operate illegally or in a “gray zone” in order to defy state control.  
Their ideology and agenda remain outside the democratic framework and the use of 
violence to achieve political ends in Jordan is not clearly rejected or even a legitimate 
means. 
The Liberation Party splintered from the MB and was founded in 1952 in 
Jerusalem by a former Muslim Brother, Shaykh Taqii al-Din al-Nabahani.  The 
Liberation Party shared the ends of the MB, but rejected the MB’s political 
accommodation since it advocates the resurgence of an Islamic caliphate and a peaceful 
overthrow of the regime in Jordan.  Therefore, the Ministry of Interior denied the last 
application of the Liberation Party for registration in 1992.  In light of the party’s attempt 
to recruit military personal of the Jordanian army and accusations that the party 
participated in an attempted assassination of King Hussein in 1993, the Liberation Party 
became suspicious of the monarchy as seeking to topple the regime by a military coup.  
Finally, the Liberation Party has strongly opposed the MB’s alignment with the 
monarchy and the MB’s commitment to democratic rules and its reformist debate about 
the role of women in society.  However, the MB and the Liberation Party share 
ideological commonalities with regard to the implementation of Islamic order (Shari’ah).  
                                                 
84 Hanieh, Women & Politics: From the Perspective of Islamic Movements in Jordan, 127–130. 
85 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 204; and Lust-Okar and 
Zerhouni, Political Participation in the Middle East, 301. 
 33
Nevertheless, since the party is missing a strong social network and has no access to the 
legal political realm, its responsiveness to political opportunities and its contribution to 
political change is marginal in comparison to the MB.86 
Movements of Islamic Nationalism, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, have not 
operated in Jordan to change the Jordanian political system.  Nevertheless, the MB 
historically has maintained close ties with Hamas, which has fueled disputes within the 
MB between the factions of “hawks,” who insist on a close relationship with Hamas, and 
“doves,” who advocate a policy of disengagement in Palestine to the benefit of a policy 
that concentrates its efforts on domestic challenges in Jordan.  Hamas, as an offshoot of 
the MB, was created in light of the Second Intifada in 1987 as a Palestinian resistance 
movement based on the MB’s ideology and social network.  Radical facets of key 
ideologues carried more weight since Hamas operated in a highly political and hostile 
environment.87  However, the monarchy’s indirect acceptance of Hamas ended when 
King Abdullah II expelled its administration in 1999 and banned Hamas in 2006 in the 
aftermath of Hamas’ electoral success.  Nevertheless, the influence of Hamas on the MB 
as its “natural ally” and on the Palestinian majority of the Jordanian population has 
remained since Hamas’ popularity is still high.88  Consequently, changes in Hamas’ 
political approach and its success in Palestine on the one hand, and the regime’s approach 
to Hamas on the other hand, affect the MB identity and strategic behavior. 
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In contrast to the previously mentioned political Islamist organizations, Islamist 
movements such as the Jamaa’ah at-Tabligh wal Da’wa (Missionary, Advocacy and 
calling or invocation to God group) do not aim to establish an Islamic state by political 
involvement.  They reject political engagement since they focus on Islamic education in 
society.  Nevertheless, they ultimately seek to shape a society that adheres to true Islam 
and that is governed by an Islamic caliphate under Islamic laws (Shari’ah) outside the 
democratic framework.  Besides the MB, the Jamaa’ah at-Tabligh wal Da’wa is a well-
established non-violent Islamic movement in Jordan’s society.  It was founded in 1945 in 
India (headquartered in today’s Pakistan) by Sheikh Mohammad Ilyas Ben Isma’il al-
Kandahlawi and spread to Jordan in 1964, expanding into Jordan in the 1970s.  The 
movement has its stronghold in the poor urban regions of Jordan (e.g., Zarqa) where it 
competes with the Salafi movement.  Thus, transitions of members of the Da’wa 
movement to the more conservative and radical strands of Salafism have emerged.89  
However, the movement’s apolitical approach and a lack of resources indicate that 
political opportunities to achieve the movement’s ends are not important.  Rather, 
missing political opportunities and a strong religious trend in public opinion (see Table 1) 
will benefit their apolitical conservative religious view since political participation does 
not pay. 
Salafism emerged in Jordan in the 1970s, advocated by Nasr al-Din al-Albani, a 
Syrian scholar who ultimately moved his activities to Jordan in 1979 when the regime in 
Damascus cracked down on the Syrian MB.  According to the Salafi movement, the 
understanding of the oneness of God (tawhid) and the literal meaning of the Quran is 
crucial to their belief.  They argue that the uniqueness of God’s attributes leaves no room 
for human interpretation.  Thus, the return to authentic Islam goes along with their 
ambition to practice Islam according to the early generations after the Prophet 
Muhammad.  As the da’wa movement, the traditional strand of the Salafi movement 
seeks to reshape society by returning to Islamic virtues without interfering in politics.   
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The movement has been supported by Saudi Arabia and was even backed by the 
Jordanian regime during the 1990s as a counterweight against the growing importance of 
the MB.90 
The Salafi movement gained strength from major incidents such as the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 and the assassination of Sadat in 1981.  The movement expanded and 
radicalized in the 1980s while some hundred “Arab Afghans,” among those Abu 
Mohammed al-Maqdisi and Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, returned to Jordan.  In light of 
unsuccessful struggles of Islamists against the repressive regimes in Egypt and Algeria, 
as well as the U.S. hegemony of the 1990s and its presence on the Arabian Peninsula, the 
jihadi strand of Salafism and Qutb’s doctrine of jihad gained in importance.  By the use 
of takfir, jihadi Salafists targeted moderate Islamists since they were perceived as 
collaborators of the regimes (“near enemy”).  As noted, in contrast to the educated middle 
class constituency of the MB (mostly Palestinian provenance), jihadi Salafists were able 
to recruit predominantly Transjordanians in the poorer and less educated realm of society.  
However, the Salafi movement in Jordan was fragmented since the Jordanian regime’s 
countermeasures proved effective and disputes between the two radical figureheads 
Maqdisi and Zarqawi occurred.  However, “the split is not in thought, it is in strategy.”91 
Nonetheless, the traditional strand of Salafism by far dominates the movement.  
But, its dogmatic world view stands in contrast to the pragmatic approach of the MB, 
which enables the incorporation of multiple identities and opens the door for 
interpretation of an Islamic approach to political challenges.  Moreover, since 
applications by the Salafi movement to create further official structures such as the Quran 
and the Sunna Society were rejected by the Ministry of Culture, the movement was 
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forced to create an informal network based on personal ties to defy state control.  
Whereas their network to accumulate resources is relatively weak in comparison to the 
MB, the Salafi ideology successfully competes with the MB and the Da’wa movement in 
mosques and private realms, as well as in religious scholarly publications.  Thus, the 
Salafi movement has gained many sympathizers among the members of established 
Islamist movements of which many have converted to Salafism.  Since an alignment with 
the regime’s policy and political participation does not pay, Salafism is gaining support 
among conservative strands in society.  Consequently, Salafism has become the most 
popular mainstream movement besides the MB.92  In contrast to the MB, the Salafi 
movement does not benefit from political opportunities.  Repression in conjunction with 
a pro-western policy resonates with their belief that any accommodation with the kufr 
regime is haram (forbidden).  In accordance with Qutb’s ideology, jihad against 
collaborators and the regime is legitimate. 
Finally, the rise of Hamas and the growing importance of Salafism in Jordan 
influence the MB strategic choice against the background of the MB accommodative 
relationship with the regime and its gradual non-violent approach to achieve its ends.  
The MB behaves according to strategic decisions in order to play by the rules of the 
regime.  The MB gained an exceptional status in the political and social realm with 
regard to its network and its ideology, since the MB embraces emerging political 
opportunities from an organizational and ideological point of view.  The question is 
whether political opportunities are likely to emerge and how the MB is able to take 
advantage of them to challenge the status quo. 
B. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Political Access 
Political access for Islamist movements is not closed, but is highly constrained by 
the regime’s laws.  The Election Law has proven to be an effective tool with which to 
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manipulate the political process in order to maintain the regime’s security by a strong 
pro-regime constituency in parliament.  Moreover, the regime’s political engineering has 
undermined the public trust in political representation and prevents political competition, 
which is supposed to radicalize political agendas, as moderation does not pay.93 
“King Abdullah II has made it clear that progress toward democracy, pluralism, 
economic prosperity and freedom of expression, speech and thought in Jordan is an 
irreversible process.”94  However, democratic progress is lagging behind Jordan’s 
economic reform agenda.  Elections in Jordan have become one element of Jordan’s 
democratic façade and survival strategy.  Several adjustments of the Election Law have 
maintained an overrepresentation of independent loyal Transjordan candidates to contain 
Islamist movements from gaining political influence.  Thus, the regime’s “political 
engineering” implemented political patron-client ties between the monarchy and its loyal 
Transjordan constituencies at the cost of the Palestinian population.95 
Major adjustments of the Election Law started in 1985 after the success of 
Islamist candidates in the “By-elections” in 1984.  The new Election Law caused a 
disproportionately low representation of the Palestinian population, in particular in 
refugee camps, in the East and West Bank, and urban areas with a significantly high 
Palestinian population, in relation to Bedouin tribal dominated rural areas.  In addition,  
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the size of electoral districts shrank and the number of their seats was cut.  The regime 
rationale behind this manipulation was to urge the electorate to vote based on kinship 
rather than ideology.96 
However, the regime’s manipulation failed in the elections in 1989.  The voting 
system “first past the post, multiple vote” allowed accumulation or distribution of votes.  
Instead of loyal constituencies in the East Bank and rural regions, oppositional political 
organizations (parties were not allowed yet) such as the Islamists and the leftists won the 
majority of the seats.  Nevertheless, in the legislative periods that followed until 1993, the 
government and the prerogatives of the King prevented the designation of an Islamist 
Prime Minister and major Islamist objectives.97 
The regime’s lessons learned in the 1989 elections led to further adjustments of 
the Election Law in preparation for the next legislative period in 1993.  A new voting 
system “one person, one vote” was implemented for the same reason as in 1985.  In 
contrast to the elections in 1989, leftist and Islamist parties lost a significant number of 
seats, whereas loyal candidates took over the majority in parliament.98  However, the 
parliamentary elections in 1993 confirmed the initial success of Islamist organizations in 
1989.  Islamists won more seats in parliament than expected.  First and foremost, the MB 
was able to mobilize their constituency in the urban cities because of their widely 
respected reputation and their well organized structures.  Moreover, the elections in 1993 
also showed the strength of the MB to incorporate Palestinian and Transjordan Islamists.  
For many Palestinians and Transjordanians the MB remained the last honest political 
broker in Jordan after the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the Jordanian-Israeli policy of 
reconciliation.99  However, along with the rise of Hamas in Gaza, as well as its popularity 
in the region and close relationship with the MB, the appeal of the MB to Palestinians is 
potentially higher than to Transjordanians who in contrast to Palestinians predominantly 
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vote according to tribal ties.100  Nevertheless, when nationwide municipal elections were 
held in 1995, for the first time in Jordan’s history, the “weight distribution” shifted to the 
rural Transjordan population.101 
Consequently, the political influence in parliament of Islamist organizations 
diminished significantly.  The regime’s policy of political containment of Islamist 
movements and privileging its loyal constituency has created a fragmented political realm 
shaped by clientelism.102  In this context, the political decline of the IAF since 1989 is 
striking, as the IAF is still the best-organized political force in Jordan and the last 
remaining party besides independent candidates in the current parliament after the 
elections of 2007.103  As recent opinion polls show, the majority of the Jordanian 
population does not trust in democratic representation and institutions to be able to 
handle Jordan’s security concerns, as well as unemployment, poverty, and corruption.  
With reference to the latest opinion polls, only five percent of the respondents believe 
that existing political parties represent their demands.  The trend of declining public 
political interest has also affected the decreasing public resonance of the MB.104  
Nonetheless, King Abdullah’s reform agenda aims to reshape the political environment 
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by encouraging the formation of stable political parties, but under the control of the 
regime in accordance with the new Political Parties Law of 2007.105 
Collectively, political opportunities for Islamist movements in Jordan will not 
occur on the basis of changes of political access in the near future.  While political access 
for Islamist movements in not closed, the Election Law and a fragmented political 
spectrum shaped by weak parties and clientelism undermines the political prospects of 
Islamist movements and promotes an apolitical society.  This trend might result in the 
MB’s withdrawal from the political tribune while focusing on its services and charity to 
maintain its organizational power in the social realm. 
2. State Repression 
Jordan’s propensity and capacity to repress in order to stay in power is 
omnipresent, but not as blunt as its neighbors Syria or Saudi Arabia demonstrate.  The 
Jordanian regime maintains control over society mainly through the implementation of 
bureaucratic regulations.  Thus, the most serious challenge for the regime’s policy of 
social control is that groups are acting outside the frame of regulations and surveillance.  
Consequently, grassroots activities are channeled in the bureaucratic state apparatus 
while activism outside the administrative frame is repressed by the mukhabarat 
(intelligence agency).106  Needless to say, political discussion and action is limited to 
political parties.  With reference to growing Islamist networks, Jordan has developed a 
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semi-state level of institutions to control charity activities.107  Consequently, the euphoria 
of political change in 1989 was short lived.  As the numbers of NGOs between 1985 and 
1989 skyrocketed,108 “defensive” means of the regime were adapted or reinforced.109 
In addition, patrimonial structures in the security apparatus and the military, in 
conjunction with coercive capabilities, manifest the strong will of the authoritarian 
regime to stay in power.110  Thus, it is striking that military expenditures increased even 
during economic crises.111  Jordan’s coup-proofed military is the backbone of the regime.  
While it is too weak to deter major threats from outside Jordan’s borders, it has been 
effective against domestic uprising, such as the riots in 1989 in Ma’an and in 1996 in 
Karak showed.112 
Repression against regime critics is supposed to alter the cost-benefit rational of 
social movements, whereas its absence might open a window of opportunity and foster 
contention.  However, besides the last political opening in 1989, repression has remained 
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on a high level without periods of substantial liberalization (see Figure 3).  It is 
noteworthy that less than fifty percent of the population in 2008 perceived that the state 
guarantees means of collective action such as demonstrations or sit-ins.113  Nevertheless, 
instead of deterrence, repression might backfire as it creates a “repressive paradox.”  On 
the one hand, repression can increase a movement’s commitment to achieve its political 
aims as well as the solidarity and identity within a movement.  On the other hand, 
emerging debates about how to respond might fuel differences between factions of a 
movement and lead to splintering groups and violence.114  Furthermore, as repression 
continuous, Islamists, who are objectionable to the regime, will attempt to defy state 
control by informal networks.115  Consequently, a radicalization of Islamist movements 
threatens the incumbents of the regime and moderate strands alike.  Nevertheless, the 
regime has been successful in containing the emergence of strong radical movements.116 
The case of Layth al-Shubaylat, a formerly independent member of the Jordanian 
Parliament who investigated corruption of the government after his election in 1989, 
sheds light on the effects of repression on Islamist movements.  The detainment and 
publicized trial was a clear sign for every political Islamist who does not obey the “rules 
of the game.”  Although Layth al-Shubaylat was not affiliated to the MB, debates within 
the MB about a cooperative relationship with the regime between the camp, which tend 
to be loyal to the regime (mainly East Bankers) and the camp, which criticizes the 
regime’s policy (mainly Palestinians), were fueled.117  Moreover, as the repression since 
1993 has continued, factionalism and a radicalization of Islamist movements is likely, as 
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the recent election of the prominent “hawk” Hamam Sa’id as the General Guide of the 
MB indicates.118  Nevertheless, the MB counterbalanced this impression as the MB’s 
Shura Council elected Abd al-Latif Arabiyat, who belongs to the moderate camp.119 
Jordan’s political stability and the regime’s security depend on its complex 
neighborhood, primarily with regard to the Palestine cause and the development in Iraq 
since 2003.  Jordan strongly supports the Saudi-Arabian initiative for a two-state solution 
in Palestine as Jordan confronts the scenario of becoming the hosting nation of 
Palestinians while losing its Transjordan heritage (“Jordanian Solution”).  Thus, Jordan 
hopes that its alliance with the West and its commitment to the reconciliation with Israel 
will pay as Jordan expects that the West, foremost the U.S., is pushing Israel to make 
concessions in the Palestinian cause.120  However, the Palestinian population will remain 
dominant even if the Palestine-Israeli peace process is successful. 
Besides the Palestine cause, Jordan confronts an unstable development in Iraq, 
which already led to half a million refugees in Jordan and an increase in jihadi Salafist 
terrorist attacks.  Jordan’s former policy of cooperation with Iraq was driven by Jordan’s 
dependency on Iraqi oil and its military weakness in the light of an aggressive Iraqi 
foreign policy.  Jordan’s cooperation with Iraq also aimed to counterbalance Syria, which 
vehemently rejects Jordan’s pro-western stance and, therefore, has been willing to take 
advantage of Jordan’s moments of weakness in the past.  However, Jordan’s pro-Iraq 
policy was adjusted beginning in the mid-1990s in light of Jordan’s economic downturn 
and the suspension of foreign aid from the West and the Gulf.  King Hussein’s 
rapprochement to the West peaked in King Abdullah’s support of the unpopular U.S. 
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policy in Iraq.  Jordan provided logistical support during the Iraq War in 2003 and has 
trained Iraqi security forces in Jordan since then.121 
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Figure 3.   Guaranteed Public Freedoms [%] in Jordan from 1996 to 2008122 
Figure 3 shows a correlation between perceived liberties and major external 
political “shocks” drawing from opinion polls.  Jordan’s policy of reconciliation with 
Israel in the early 1990s and its rapprochement with the former anti-Iraq coalition since 
1994, in particular because of economic reasons and foreign aid, was a focal point of 
public and political criticism in Jordan.  The regime’s approach of preemptive repression 
shaped the remaining years of the era King Hussein (until 1999).123  The first major 
setback of civil liberties beginning in 2000 corresponds with a failing Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process and the Second Intifada, Jordan’s support of the U.S. in the War on Terror, 
and the preparation of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.124  Parliament was suspended between 
2001 and 2003 and the elections of 2001 postponed.  The new monarch was concerned 
about the effects of his foreign policy on the behavior of the electorate.  As the elections 
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in the past showed, a fair election law might shift the power in parliament from the tribal 
Transjordan constituency to the Palestinian population in Jordan.125  The averaged 
perceived civil liberties and freedom of the press decreased significantly (about ten 
percent) between King Abdullah’s accession to the throne in 1999 and 2001.  The rise of 
Hamas in 2006 and emerging violence in Gaza, as well as the regime’s restrictions in 
preparation for elections in 2007, marked the next setback of civil liberties.  Furthermore, 
the respondents of these opinion polls also assessed foreign issues as being responsible 
for this development.  They acknowledged that Jordan’s security concerns do not allow 
for rapid political change.126 
Consequently, Jordan’s hostile neighborhood and its pro-western policy is a 
constraint for liberalism in Jordan.  Western interests and policy in Jordan’s 
neighborhood impinge on liberalization in Jordan.  Thus, since the public acknowledges 
Jordan’s security concerns and “red lines” are well known and as state repression is 
discriminate, people tend to accept reduced civil liberties and to refuse action against the 
regime.  Thus, opposition to the regime is constrained since the majority might not see it 
as legitimate.  However, windows of opportunity might derive from changes of the 
balance of power of elites and new influential allies as the next section explores. 
3. Elites and Alliances 
King Abdullah inherited a stable elite structure without major rifts and alliances, 
which could threaten the power of the King.  Although major changes in the elite 
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circles of elites gave evidence for continuity rather than change as major security 
concerns occurred in the aftermath of the al-Aqsa Intifada, as well as with regard to 
Jordan’s pro-U.S. policy in Iraq.127 
King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999 without an established “coterie” 
that pledged allegiance to him as he was designated only days before King Hussein’s 
death.  Although the royal far-reaching prerogatives aim to put the Jordanian monarch in 
a position of uncontested rule, the politically inexperienced Abdullah faced the challenge 
of shaping a loyal elite structure to maintain the security of his reign.  Moreover, as 
changes at the top of a state are supposed to lead to rifts in the balance of power, 
windows of opportunity might occur for the rise of new elites and for new alliances.  
Therefore, Islamist movements might benefit from contention in the elite structure if they 
are able to project their influence in the inner circles of the King or even challenge the 
power of the monarchy in cooperation with influential allies.  Vice versa, elites might 
reach out for strong movements to support their case by assuming the public tribune.128  
The rise of new elites or changes of elite positions (of the first and second circles in 
Figure 4) challenges the balance of power and threatens the stability of the elite structure 
and the King’s ability to control the behavior of elites.  Thus, conflicts between elites are 
resolved by removing them from their positions.129  Moreover, elites fall from favor as 
“red lines” are crossed, as the dismissals of the heads of the General Intelligence 
Department (GID), Samih Battiki in 2000 and Mohammed Dahabi in 2008 showed.130 
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The King’s policy of choosing and reshuffling elites has a long tradition in Jordan 
and has two major effects.  First, it secures the King’s base of power by maintaining 
patrimonial dependencies and, therefore, limits the power of elites.  Second, it channels 
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Figure 4.   Concentric Circles of Jordanian Elites 2002131 
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However, institutions do not have a fixed position within the elite structure.  Thus, 
with regard to the first two concentric circles of elites, the King appoints and dismisses 
elites depending on personal ties and loyalty.  Whereas elites of the first circle directly 
contribute to the decision making on the strategic level, elites of the second circle 
influence these decisions as far as their area of responsibility is concerned.  By contrast, 
elites of the third circle predominantly draw their legitimacy from their popularity and 
might have a voice within the limits the regime sets.132 
As Jordan’s hostile neighborhood and internal security in the past has shown, 
security issues have dominated Jordanian politics ever since.  Moreover, given the nature 
of Jordan’s “hybrid” regime, the sources for recruiting elites are the security services, the 
police, and the military.  In addition, the senate, which members are appointed by the 
King, provides a “pool” of political elites of the first circle (political advisors).  Besides 
the importance of the Prime Minister for the conduct of the regime’s policy, the speaker 
of the senate communicates the political will of the King to the lower house as a directive 
for the rubber stamp process.133 
By contrast, the public will has no access to the inner circles of the King.  
Members of the lower house, which are directly elected, accede only the third circle.  
Needless to say, elites from the political opposition or the critical public, who, however, 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the monarchy, do not accede the first two circles of the 
King.  From the perspective of the King, elites of the third circle cannot be fully 
controlled such as the IAF and professional associations, which proved to be the strongest 
legal oppositions to the regime’s policy (in particular after the policy of reconciliation 
with Israel in the 1990s).  Nevertheless, popular journalists such as Fahd al-Fanek, who 
writes for the Jordan Times and the Lebanese Daily Star and favors a pro-Transjordan 
stance, belong to the third circle as important brokers of the monarchy’s opinion.  
Therefore, the third circle functions as a buffer zone of the King’s first two circles and 
vice versa influences opposing bottom-up trends.134  Moreover, it is striking that the 
                                                 
132 Bank and Schlumberger, Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform, 36–37, 43–44. 
133 Ibid., 37–39, 44–47. 
134 Ibid., 47–49. 
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ulema (clergy) as traditional elite in Islamic states is pushed back to the third circle.  
While this is a clear sign to limit the power of the ulema, it also reflects the monarch’s 
religious self-confidence as belonging to the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Consequently, the architecture of the elite structures has not substantially changed 
after Abdullah’s succession.  However, besides the “traditional” elites, business elites 
gained access to all circles in the light of Abdullah’s remarkable economic reform agenda 
and improved macroeconomic conditions.135  Nevertheless, the King’s pursuit of 
economic reform is a response to the economic and fiscal pressure on Jordan but also an 
attempt to dominate the debate about Jordan’s path to a “modern” Islamic state.  The 
King’s agenda is framed in a narrative, which aims to maintain western trust in the 
Jordanian regime and to draw the public awareness to domestic (economic) challenges 
while the regime’s pro-western policy is increasingly unpopular.136 
The Economic Consultative Council (ECC) became the driving force for the 
creation and implementation of the King’s reform agenda.  Consequently, the ECC 
became a new source for recruiting elites, which belong to the same privileged western 
educated generation of Abdullah, believing in economic liberalism.  In addition, besides 
these patterns of elite recruitment, families of wealthy Palestinian provenance (al-Masri) 
or of a traditional tribal Transjordan heritage (al Sha’ir) receive lucrative posts within the 
circles of elites.  Members of privileged families, which were able to attract Abdullah’s 
attention, became important brokers of the King’s reform agenda against conservative 
elites from the security apparatus or the political realm.  Thus, the ECC, which is not only 
responsible for the conduct Jordan’s economic agenda but expanded to realms such as 
                                                 
135 With reference to a World Bank Study on 20 countries in the Middle East in 2009, Jordan was 
assessed as the country which conducted the highest number of economic reforms.  Privatization of state 
owned companies, foreign investment, especially from the U.S. and EU as well as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, 
has increased significantly.  Domestic consumption, demand in the building industry (caused by massive 
immigration since the Iraq War began in 2003), and foreign trade have all increased considerably.  Despite 
the ongoing crisis of the world economy, Jordanian annual economic growth has averaged six percent since 
2007.  World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, "Doing Business in the Arab World 2010: 
Comparing Regulations in 20 Countries," The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / 
The World Bank, http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/FullReport/2010/DB10_ArabWorld.pdf 
(accessed February 12, 2010). 
136 "Opinion Poll: Revisiting the Arab Street: Research from within (February 2005)," Center for 
Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, http://www.css-jordan.org (accessed February 12, 2010); and 
Bank and Schlumberger, Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform, 52–53. 
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educational, administrative and institutional reforms as well as legislation, became the 
reform motor and a “hoard” for handpicked elites of the King.137 
Finally, the King’s reshuffling of the elite structures has been successful.138  A 
top-down approach of further liberalization that favors Islamist movements is not likely 
since rifts within the “power map” of the King have not occurred.  Neither the “old” 
elites nor the elites from the business sector are inclined to embrace Islamist movements.  
Whereas new business elites of the inner circle of the King are supposed to prevent 
economic deliberalization, they are concerned about political transitions that threaten the 
business climate, in particular with regard to the negative image of Islamists in the West.  
Potential allies for the social movement sector are pushed back to the third circle, which 
lacks the power to significantly influence the decision-making process or even to 
challenge the power of the King.139  Therefore, alliances between elites in opposition to 
the regime are more likely to emerge within the third circle among likeminded elites, as 
cross partisan coalitions in opposition to the regime’s policy of reconciliation with Israel 
in the 1990s showed.140 
Collectively, the political opportunity structure in Jordan is less likely to open 
windows of opportunity “top-down” as the restricted political access, the sophisticated 
pattern of repression, and the stable “power map” show.  Therefore, the next section 
explores political opportunities for Islamist movements, which derive from trends of 
public opinion with regard to Jordan’s political system and Jordan’s struggle for identity 
along with social changes. 
                                                 
137 Bank and Schlumberger, Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform, 41–43. 
138 Robinson, Defensive Democratization in Jordan, 388–389. 
139 Giacomo Luciani, "Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East," in Debating Arab 
Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 174; Bank and Schlumberger, Jordan: Between Regime Survival and 
Economic Reform, 46, 54–56; Greenwood, Jordan's "New Bargain:" the Political Economy of Regime 
Security, 248; and Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: 
The Case of Jordan," Canadian Journal of Political Science 25, no. 1 (1992): 75. 
140 Clark, The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in 
Jordan, 544–545; and Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 161–171, 
299. 
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4. Struggle for Identity and Democracy 
Jordan is divided with regard to its identity and its public opinion about a political 
system, which is most appropriate to handle the current political, economic, and social 
challenges.  In addition to the Transjordan-Palestine divide, rifts in society occurred as 
clientelism increased along with social changes inflicted by the state’s retreat from social 
welfare.  With regard to social and religious demands of the public, Islamist movements 
are predestined to bridge rifts in Jordan’s society by providing solidarity and identity. 
Jordan’s Transjordan heritage is becoming contested as the Palestinian influence 
has been growing.  Patrimonial structures have been a cornerstone of the regime’s 
security since Transjordanians dominate the security apparatus and the military, which is 
the biggest employer in Jordan.141  Thus, according to Jordanian “traditions” the 
Transjordan population tends to be loyal to the regime in exchange for privileges in the 
public sector and social services, whereas the Palestinian population has developed a 
more independent stance in the private economy.142  Hence, the regime’s policy of 
economic and social adjustment in accordance with Jordan’s agreement with the 












                                                 
141 Bank and Schlumberger, Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform, 46; and 
Baylouny, Militarizing Welfare: Neo-Liberalism and Jordanian Policy, 282–293. 
142 The Palestinian population has increased significantly in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli wars of 
1948 and 1967 and not least because of a higher birth rate. 
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communities.  Therefore, the lasting economic pressure on the regime might again lead to 
a phase of political opening in response to growing protests against the regime as in 
1989.143 
Consequently, to the extent that “neo-liberal economic policies removed a key 
source of welfare,” they could be leading to more opposition to the regime.144  In this 
context, the regime’s downsizing social welfare provides an opportunity for Islamist 
movements to link empirical credibility of social injustice with its just motives and goals 
by providing social welfare and solidarity.  Accordingly, Islamist movements are able to 
increase resources and recruitment along with an expansion of their networks as the case 
of Hizballah has shown.145  Nevertheless, as noted, acknowledging Jordan’s successful 
macroeconomic situation in comparison to other states in the region, and generous 
western aid, social cleavages could be even more significant. 
Patron-client ties also affect the political system in Jordan as several adjustments 
of the Election Law in order to maintain a strong loyal Transjordan majority in 
                                                 
143 Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, Political Liberalization and Democratization in the 
Arab World: Comparative Experiences, vol. 2 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 93.        
Political and economic “shocks” from outside Jordan made a new fiscal policy inevitable.  Jordan’s pro-
Iraqi stance in the Second Gulf War led to its economic malaise as IMF funds and U.S. aid was suspended.  
Subsidies declined from 3.1 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1990 to 1 percent in 1994.  In 
2000, under the pressure of IMF, King Abdullah abolished all food and oil subsidies but granted direct cash 
transfers to counterbalance public criticism.  However, General Sales Taxes significantly increased from 10 
percent in 1995 to 16 percent in 2004 as well as inflation peaked in 2008 (14.8 percent) as about half a 
million refugees from Iraq sought for shelter during and in the aftermath of the Iraq War in 2003.  In 
addition, generous oil supply by the former Iraqi regime ended in 2003 (5.5 million tons of crude oil 
annually worth $ 600 million).  Unemployment is estimated to have reached up to 30 percent in 2008 
(unofficial rate).  However, as the government’s Poverty Alleviation Strategy of 2002 stipulates, “No-one 
knows exactly how many Jordanians are poor today, where they live, or what their demographic 
characteristics are…poverty is on the increase in Jordan.”  It is interesting to note, that substantial 
economic reforms (211 laws) were passed by royal decree while the parliament was suspended in 2001 
(election in 2003).  Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Jordan," Central Intelligence 
Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html (accessed April 29, 
2010); and Jane Harrigan, Hamed El-Said and Chengang Wang, "The IMF and the World Bank in Jordan: 
A Case of Over Optimism and Elusive Growth," The Review of International Organizations 1, no. 3 
(September, 2006): 270–272, 275, 282. 
144 Baylouny, Militarizing Welfare: Neo-Liberalism and Jordanian Policy, 278. 
145 William Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Frontiers in Social Movement 
Theory, eds. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 
69; and Judith Palmer Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support 
for Lebanon's Hizballah," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (March, 1996): 49–62. 
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Parliament show.146  In this context, Lust-Okar’s research on clientelism in Jordan 
highlights that the Transjordan population, which dominates the rural areas, tends to vote 
for independent Transjordan candidates according to tribal ties.147  Nonetheless, 
Palestinians who predominantly live in the urban areas of Jordan primarily support 
candidates from their district since they mistrust the effectiveness of political parties as 
the Transjordanians do.  However, turnouts in urban Palestinian districts are lower than in 
the rural Transjordan areas.  The voting behavior of the Palestinians follows the motto 
“nothing to win” whereas the Transjordanians fear “something to lose.”148  
Consequently, the King’s ability to redistribute patronage and manage political 
participation to prevent Islamists from gaining influence seems to be successful at first 
glance.149  Nevertheless, the regime’s policy has fostered clientelism along with a 
reduction of social welfare, which hampers the emergence of civil society and of lasting 
political parties.  The regime is caught by the “dictator’s dilemma,” since weak and 
fragmentized political and social realms are also less favorable for the security of the 
regime while institutions to mitigate demands from below are missing.  Moreover, the 
regime is the main visible actor and therefore the main target of criticism while 
liberalization falls short.  Thus, repression remains as the only alternative to 
liberalization, which threatens the status quo.150 
However, with regard to the resurgence of Islam in the entire region since the 
1970s and in the light of corruption, unemployment and poverty as well as foreign policy 
                                                 
146 Hassan Abu Hanieh, Women & Politics: From the Perspective of Islamic Movements in Jordan, 
ed. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Amman, Jordan: Economic Printing Press, 2008), 118–130. 
147 In contrast to only 19.3 percent of Palestinians, 56.8 percent of Transjordanians are affiliated to 
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Islamist Parties in the Arab World?" Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
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Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 
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Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents and Institutions, 169–172. 
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concerns, Palestinians and Transjordanians are supposed to share common interests.  
Nevertheless, nationalist strands, particularly within the Transjordan community, have 
attempted to exploit the fear that Jordan might lose its Transjordan heritage.  In this 
context, the Palestinians dominance in the economic sector and the “Palestinian cause” is 
of main concern as the regime’s campaign for national unity “Jordan First” in 2002 
against an increasing Palestinian influence shows.151  However, as a comparative study 
of the success of Islamist parties in the Middle East highlights, political power will be 
assumed by those political parties which are able to bridge the identity-based divisions 
and clientelism in order to challenge elites and established institutions.152  Thus, the 
identity of the Islamist movement, as the next chapter explores, has to be flexible enough 









                                                 
151 Clark, The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in 
Jordan, 546; Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso, Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World, 54; 
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152 Robbins, What Accounts for the Success of Islamist Parties in the Arab World?, 38. 
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identities with different levels of commitment to the movement.  Munson, Islamic Mobilization: Social 
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Domestic issues of main concern Corruption Poverty Unemployment 
Year / [%] 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 
A parliamentary system in which only 
Islamist parties compete in parliamentary 
elections 
9 9 9 10 7 8 
A political system ruled by a strong 
authority that makes decisions without 
considering election results or opposition 
opinions 
5 14 7 15 7 15 
A system governed by Islamic Shari’ah 
without elections or political parties 30 28 31 28 29 28 
Multiparty Parliamentary Democracy 
(nationalist, leftist, rightist and Islamist) 44 38 38 33 41 35 
None of these systems 1 3 1 5 1 5 
Don’t know 15 8 16 9 15 9 
Table 1.   Public Opinion Poll about Political Systems in Jordan154 
Moreover, besides the rifts in Jordan’s identity, the public opinion to the question 
of what political system is best suited to solve the present domestic challenges in Jordan 
is divided (Table 1).  The respondents are less in favor of a democratic system of western 
provenance as western rhetoric assumes.  The second largest group of respondents, close 
behind the democratic camp (yellow row), favored the implementation of Shari’ah 
without elections and political parties as the best political system for Jordan (green row).  
Despite an increase of six percent since 2007, every second respondent dismissed a 
democratic system in Jordan.  However, since the regime’s policy of deliberalization 
along with a growing social injustice and corruption has been branded democratic by 
western rhetoric, a majority of Jordanians will not embrace this kind of democracy.  
Nonetheless, this trend in public opinion offers political opportunities for Islamist 
movements to attract a majority of the Jordanian public by bridging these two camps and 
linking the implementation of Shari’ah in a democratic multiparty system. 
In addition, as the public opinion about the government’s performance shows, 
public criticism does not focus on the King but on the government.  The dissolving of the 
government and the parliament in November 2009 by the King, and his call for new 
parliamentary elections by the end of 2010, were reasoned by the government’s bad 
                                                 
154 Braizat, Opinion Poll: Democracy in Jordan 2008. 
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performance and the public discontent regarding the implementation of necessary reforms 
as clientelism has increased in parliament.  Nevertheless, while the King aims to push 
Jordan’s economic modernization the public fears economic and social consequences.155  
Whereas the King of Jordan remains in a sacrosanct position, the government has to play 
the role of the “scapegoat.”  This dual “game” has successfully channeled pressure from 
below to the government and secured the monarchy’s almost unchallenged position.  
Therefore, opposition to the regime is limited as the public acknowledges Jordan’s hostile 
neighborhood and public criticism does not focus on the King despite his political 
responsibility and his far-reaching prerogatives.  Thus, as Goodwin puts it, “…people do 
not tend to join or support revolutionary movements when they believe that the central 
state has little if anything to do with their everyday problems, however severe those 
problems may be.”156 
Finally, Islamist movements are predestined to respond to the public concerns 
(e.g., corruption and poverty) as they provide the message of solidarity and social 
justices.  It is widely perceived that religious piety is immune to selfish and corrupt 
behavior.  In contrast to the previous factors that prevent political opportunities to emerge 
top-down, political opportunities might emerge if Islamist movements are able to bridge 
Jordan’s divided identity and clientelism as well as antagonistic political views.  This 
bridge can be built based on a broad and flexible identity of the movement as the MB 
provides it most successfully.  Nevertheless, clientelism in Jordan and in many countries 
in the Middle East has a long tradition and is not likely to change in the short-term in 
light of stalled democratization and repression along with declining social welfare. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The ideologies of different Islamist movements in Jordan have common roots, but 
their identities have changed significantly.  A wide spectrum of ideologies exists, which 
                                                 
155 Braizat, Opinion Poll: Democracy in Jordan 2008; and Achim Vogt, "Wechsel ohne politischen 
Wandel? Der Wunsch des Königs nach Reformen bringt Jordanien eine neue Regierung, aber auch die 
Auflösung des Parlaments," Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Amman, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/06931.pdf 
(accessed May 14, 2010). 
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range from a non-violent gradual political approach, which enables Islamic interpretation 
over an apolitical religious ideology, to a rigid ideology of jihad against kufr regimes and 
Muslim collaborators.  Finally, religious ideology is a necessary amplifier of preexisting 
political and social grievances, but it fails to explain the strategic decisions of Islamist 
movements to compete against each other by playing to the regime’s rules. 
The MB dominates the Islamist spectrum from an organizational and ideological 
point of view and has the potential to challenge the regime’s power effectively.  Its 
responsiveness to political opportunities is high as its identity is able to bridge 
clientelism, rifts within Jordan’s identity, and antagonistic political views in contrast to 
the rigid worldview of its major competitor the Salafi movement, which excludes the 
majority of the Jordanian population.  Besides the MB, the moderate spectrum is weak 
since it has lacked support at the grassroots level and has missed achieving lasting 
political influence.  In contrast to the moderate strands of Islamism, the fragmented 
radical spectrum has grown in strength.  However, radical movements are not able to 
accumulate resources through their networks in Jordan as the MB could since the 
pressure of the security apparatus is high.  Therefore, radical Islamism in Jordan is not 
likely to assume the predominance in the Islamist spectrum as long as the regime does 
not indiscriminately repress moderate strands.157 
Changes within Jordan’s Islamist spectrum create opportunities for the emergence 
of new Islamist movements and forces established movements to make strategic 
decisions.  Besides disputes with regard to crucial Islamic beliefs such as tawhid or jihad, 
a process of political opening will increase the pressure on movements to debate their 
political approaches.  If repression decreases, Islamist movements have to adjust their 
focus from opposition to the regime to solving political challenges and prepare for taking 
over political responsibility while Islamist political “gray-zones” dissolve.  This process  
 
 
                                                 
157 See relationship between the factors of repression with regard to timing and targeting versus 
inclusion of Islamist movements in Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic 
World, 203–205.  
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is supposed to cause political contention and factionalism within the Islamist spectrum in 
general, and within larger movements as the MB in particular as political opportunities 
emerge. 
However, political opportunities “top-down” are not likely to occur. Major 
political and economic “shocks” from outside the country and domestic political and 
social changes were effectively countered by limited political access and repression.  
Jordan’s “power map” was not substantially redrawn after King Abdullah ascended the 
throne in 1999.  Elites from the security apparatus and the military, as well as from the 
political realm, still dominated the inner circles of the King.  Nevertheless, a new elite 
segment has occurred as Abdullah has followed an approach of “more business as 
usual.”158  Neither the old elites nor the new business elites embrace an increasing 
political significance of Islamist movements.  However, this does not necessarily mean 
that major economic and political changes, which led to a short-lived political opening 
between 1989 and 1993, might not challenge the regime’s power in the future and trigger 
political contention.  Nevertheless, Jordan has survived major political and economic 
shocks since this period of political opening as Chapter IV elaborates in detail. 
The regime’s retreat from social welfare, along with economic reforms, opened a 
window of opportunity for Islamist movements to link empirical credibility of social 
injustice with the just motives and goals of the movements and to expand their 
networks.159  Islamist movements are supposed to be successful if their ideology is 
capable of bridging clientelism and rifts between the Palestinian and Transjordan 
identities as well as competing views with regard to Jordan’s political system since 
western democracy is by far not “the only game in town.”160 
Moreover, the regime is defensive with regard to its dependence on the West, its 
increasing challenges in the economic and social realms, as well as corruption and 
                                                 
158 Bank and Schlumberger, Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform, 54. 
159 Gamson, The Social Psychology of Collective Action, 69. 
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Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
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unemployment.  However, many Jordanians have acknowledged Jordan’s successful 
stance in the international arena in contrast to other authoritarian Arab countries in the 
Middle East.  In addition, King Abdullah has sought to address the religious concerns of 
many Jordanians in his Amman Message, as well as economic decisions of symbolic 
importance such as the promotion of Islamic banks in the financial sector.161  However, 
the King faces the “dictator’s dilemma,” while a transition to participatory politics is the 
remaining exit strategy, which necessarily incorporates the inclusion of Islamist 
movements.162 
Finally, this chapter shows that “what matters for the stability of any regime is not 
the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of 
preferable alternatives.”163  Since no alternative strong secular movements are on the 
rise, moderate Islamist movements cannot be ignored.164  This begs the question: are 
Islamist organizations preferable?  Since the MB is the most promising movement in 
opposition to the regime, the next chapter focuses on the political inclusion of the MB 
and its contribution to Jordan’s path to democracy. 
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III. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: POLITICAL INCLUSION 
OF THE MB 
The previous chapter examined the factors that shape strategic behavior of 
Islamist movements and highlighted the MB’s outstanding responsiveness to potential 
political opportunities from an organizational and ideational point of view.  In addition, 
the MB assumed a special relationship with the Hashemite monarchy based on a 
commonality of interests that has served both sides spanning decades.  The MB expanded 
in the social and political realms, whereas the Hashemite monarchy was able to achieve 
two objectives: (1) creating a counterweight to radical pan-Arab nationalism, and later, 
radical Islamism; and (2) since 1989, legitimizing the monarchy by controlled political 
liberalization and cooptation of a major political force in the country.  However, as the 
previous chapter showed, liberalism and political access have decreased, since the mid-
1990s while the pro-western policy of the monarchy under the reign of King Abdullah II 
has increased significantly. 
This context raises three questions: (1) Has the accommodative relationship 
between the monarchy and the MB reached its limits or can it continue indefinitely?  (2) 
Is the MB on a path to radicalization in light of repression and limited political access?  
(3) Does a substantial inclusion of the MB in the Jordanian polity bode well for 
democratizing Jordan, or will it harm the process of democratic progress? 
This chapter explores the significance of the special relationship and its effects on 
the MB’s behavior from an organizational and ideational perspective, drawing from three 
phases.  First, this thesis examines the rise of the MB between its foundation in 1945 and 
its major political success in 1989.  This era shows the benefits of the special relationship 
for both sides.  The MB backed the regime in many instances for strategic reasons rather 
than ideology.  Pragmatic decisions of the MB paid off as its network became the 
dominant force in the social realm and gained substantial access to the ministerial level. 
The second phase between 1990 and 1999 is characterized by major political 
changes, which eroded the “pact” between the monarchy and the MB.  The regime’s 
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policy of reconciliation with Israel caused serious tension between the monarchy and the 
MB.  Nevertheless, despite increasing repression and decreasing political access, the MB 
did not become more radical in its action or with regard to its ideas.  Rather, this phase 
shows the MB’s capabilities to align with antagonistic political forces in order to achieve 
common goals.  Again, strategic decisions based on cost-benefit considerations prevailed.  
Nevertheless, “red lines” regarding the MB’s interpretation of Islamic law were not 
crossed.  The MB rejected concessions since it became clear that political ends could not 
be achieved. 
Third, the era of King Abdullah II from 1999 to 2009 led to the end of the 
relationship between the monarchy and the MB as the regime opted for an unconditional 
pro-western policy.  Disputes between factions of the MB about the MB’s political 
approach in light of repression and decreasing political access increased.  However, 
internal debates to specify ambiguous ends show the ideational diversity of the MB, 
which indicates a potential of moderation.  The weight distribution between moderate and 
radical factions within the MB changed but did not lead to a radicalization of the MB’s 
political agenda.  Rather, the political agenda of 2009 reflects the MB’s commitment to 
democracy in accordance with Shari’ah.  Major foreign political incidents driven by the 
western interests in Jordan’s neighborhood shaped the MB’s political agenda. 
Consequently, a substantial political inclusion of the MB will bode well for 
Jordan’s path to democracy if political competition within the framework of stable 
institutions is established.  Political competition will force the MB to make further 
strategic decisions to maintain its stance as the leading Islamist mainstream movement in 
Jordan.  Its political ambiguity will resolve along with taking over political responsibility, 
as the MB will be forced to offer solutions to Jordan’s major challenges.  Political access 
will provide incentives for political cooperation and confrontation, which will shape ideas 
of different factions of the MB and increase the likelihood of moderation. 
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A. THE “GOLDEN ERA” OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (1945–1989) 
Despite the initial warm beginning of the relationship between the monarchy and 
the MB,165 the “pact” between the two sides incorporated potential conflicts from the 
beginning with regard to the monarchy’s close western ties on the one hand, and the 
MB’s support of the Palestinian resistance on the other hand.166  However, the 
relationship between the monarchy and the MB was not severely threatened until 1989, as 
the organizational benefits of the MB outweighed the cost of its alignment with the 
regime.  The MB’s accommodation with the regime gives evidence for the MB 
pragmatist approach focusing on a strategic choice based on the rules of the “pact.” 
The 1948 war in Palestine marked the turning point of the MB’s apolitical 
approach. Palestinians and Transjordanians were attracted by leftist pan-Arab nationalism 
and the MB.  The MB sharpened its political profile, took part in parliamentary elections 
in the 1950s, and became a counterweight to the revolutionary leftist movements.167  
After a coup attempt of 1957, King Hussein imposed martial law, which banned all 
political organizations except the MB.  Thus, the MB was able to set the organizational 





                                                 
165 The MB always respected the Islamic roots of the Hashemites in Jordan who belong to the 
Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Muhammad. Vice versa, King Abdullah I warmly welcomed the MB as 
providing a chance to strengthen his Islamic legitimacy. Boulby and Voll, The Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993, 39. 
Speech of King Abdullah I: “I will combat [the spread of] communism and [the establishment of] 
foreign schools because both are a threat to our society.  The first is in contradiction with our Islamic 
religion, our Prophet’s teachings, and the Holy Koran … The second is a thorn planted by colonialists to 
create division within the nation’s ranks … I seek to play an important role in the Arab world to combat 
them.” Hourani et al., Islamic Action Front Party, 10. 
166 The MB’s engagement in Palestine was limited: “The Brothers paid lip service to the idea of 
resistance, but beyond organizing weapons training, they were largely inactive.” Gunning, Hamas in 
Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence, 28. 
167 The MB was also seen as a means to contain radical Islamist – however less strong than the leftist 
revolutionary movement – such as the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir) founded in Jerusalem in 
1952. Hourani et al., Islamic Action Front Party, 15. 
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from the Gulf States increased significantly.  In addition, the repression of the Nasser 
regime against the Egyptian MB made it clear that the MB’s alignment with the 
Jordanian monarchy was without alternative.168 
The decline of Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 gave rise to 
Islamist and Palestinian resistance movements in the Middle East.  The emergence of the 
PLO challenged the authorities in Jordan as the regime lost control over parts of the 
country.  The MB backed the monarchy’s crackdown on the PLO since the PLO’s leftist 
ideology and influence in Jordan challenged the MB’s moderate Islamist approach.169  
With the MB’s main rival neutralized, the MB assumed predominance in the social 
movement sector in Jordan.  Not surprisingly, as the socioeconomic situation during the 
economic crisis of the 1980s deteriorated, the MB’s demands for political change 
increased.170  The MB stayed loyal to the monarchy despite Jordan’s unchanged 
relationship with Egypt after the Oslo Accords of 1978, as well as Jordan’s 
rapprochement to Syria and its backing of Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s.171 
However, the Intifada in 1987 showed the diverging interests of the monarchy and 
the MB in Palestine.  The MB’s reluctance in the Palestinian resistance was revised as to 
the decision to create Hamas on the basis of the MB’s network in Gaza and the West 
Bank as a counterweight against the PLO and the Islamic Jihad.172  The foundation of 
Hamas and the growing Palestinian resistance stood in contrast to the monarchy’s 
                                                 
168 Only the MB’s opposition against Jordan’s membership in the Bagdad Pact led to crisis of the 
relationship with the monarchy when the MB’s General Director was arrested in 1958. Rumman, The 
Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing 'Political Setback' Or 
Diminished Popularity, 18; and Boulby and Voll, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-
1993, 39, 65. 
169 Choucair-Vizoso, Illusive Reform: Jordan's Stubborn Stability, 48; and Boulby and Voll, The 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993, 24–26, 92–94. 
170 Jordan’s rents decreased as they depend on (1) foreign aid from western countries and 
“petrodollars” from states in the Gulf region, and (2) remittance from Jordanians working in the Gulf 
region. Brynen, Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of 
Jordan, 70–72. 
171 Jordan backed the Syrian crack down on the MB in Syria. Jordan repressed the MB’s support for 
their counterparts in Syria. Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, 99. 
172 Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence, 36. 
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decision of disengagement in Palestine in 1988.173  The monarchy was concerned about 
Jordan’s stability with regard to a radicalization of the Palestinian population and the 
growing discontent of Transjordanians, who were particularly affected by the economic 
austerity of the 1980s.174  Moreover, the emergence of Hamas also affected the internal 
structures of the MB.  The MB was concerned about factionalism between Palestinians 
and Transjordanians, as well as between reformists of Hasan al-Banna’s school of 
thought and radicals advocating the ideology of Sayyid Qutb.175  However, neither the 
MB nor the regime was able to develop a clear approach to Hamas, which has affected 
the relationship between the regime and the MB ever since. 
The monarchy’s stability depends on budget security, the ability to maintain 
patrimonial structures, and a “social contract” which was designed to buy off the 
demands from below.  Jordan’s fiscal crisis began in the early 1980s when the U.S. 
refused further aid as Jordan rejected a peace treaty with Israel.  The crisis increased as a 
consequence of Jordan’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War when the remittances 
and petrodollars from the Gulf States declined significantly.176  The economic crisis in 
conjunction with social unrest led to the monarchy’s decision to call for the first full 
parliamentary elections in 1989 since the war in 1967.177  It is striking that the MB did 
                                                 
173 The King’s speech of disengagement in Palestine was interpreted in two ways. Transjordanians 
interpreted the King’s speech as his commitment to the Transjordan predominance in Jordan, whereas the 
Palestinians interpreted the King’s speech as Jordan being a state open for the Palestinian population until 
the Palestinian state is established. Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite 
Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
1999), 228. 
174 The loyal Transjordan population depends on public employment and state subsidies in contrast to 
the Palestinian population, which dominates the private economic sector. Boulby and Voll, The Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993, 95; and Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist 
Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 199.  
175 Rumman, The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing 
'Political Setback' Or Diminished Popularity, 87. 
176 Brynen, Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of 
Jordan, 74; and Linda Adams, "Political Liberalization in Jordan: An Analysis of the State's Relationship 
with the Muslim Brotherhood," Journal of Church and State 38, no. 3 (1996): 508. 
177 Parties were not legal yet and the campaign period was limited to twenty-five days.  Social groups 
that were already organized due to tribal structures or Islam communities as the MB profited most. Brynen, 
Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan, 72–78, 90–92; 
and Adams, Political Liberalization in Jordan: An Analysis of the State's Relationship with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, 509. 
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not directly take part in the unrest and did not criticize King Hussein, nor did the riots 
protest for democracy but against the reductions of subsidies.  The MB remained loyal to 
the monarchy since the MB benefited from its privileged stance in the social realm.  The 
monarchy’s rationale for calling for elections aimed to make the political opposition 
accountable for unpopular reforms forced by the agreement with the IMF in 1989 and to 
manifest “new patron-client ties” to the loyal Transjordan population by giving them 
more influence in parliament.178 
However, the earth shattering success of the MB in the elections in 1989 shocked 
the incumbents of the Jordanian regime.  The MB’s political program was committed to 
democracy and pluralism, human and minority rights, but strongly opposed to secular 
trends.  Its primary goals were the complete liberation of Palestine from Israeli 
occupation and the implementation of Shari’ah.179  The MB was able to take advantage 
of the political opportunity provided by the regime’s liberalization of 1989 as it expanded 
in the social and political realms.180 
Consequently, the MB’s accommodation with the regime has paid off.  A strong 
faction in favor of a pro-accommodative stance with the regime spearheaded the MB 
approach, which went along with the regime’s policy of disengagement in Palestine.  The 
increase of organizational capabilities and the unprecedented political success in 1989 
calmed down critics, who were against the gradual accommodative approach.  Thus, the 
MB policy of accommodation with the regime was backed from an organizational point 
of view and by the MB’s ideology of a gradual bottom-up approach in the spirit of Hasan 
al-Banna and Al-Hudabi. 
                                                 
178 Robinson, Defensive Democratization in Jordan, 391–392. 
179 The MB won 22 of 80 available seats.  The voting system “First past the post, multiple vote” 
allowed accumulation / distribution of votes. Greenwood, Jordan's "New Bargain:" the Political Economy 
of Regime Security, 253–254; and Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 
159–160. 
180 Ibid., 252–254. 
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B. FROM WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITIES TO STAGNATION (1990-1999) 
The window of opportunity in 1989 was wide open for the MB, but too wide from 
the perspective of the regime.  The initial liberalization stagnated and the “pact” between 
the MB and the monarchy eroded significantly as the regime opted for a stronger pro-
western policy.  Nevertheless, the MB was still willing to obey to the rules of the “pact” 
since the organizational benefits outweighed the costs of a confrontation with the regime.  
The MB’s ideational responsiveness to political challenges enabled cross-ideological 
cooperation, which indicates their pragmatism and the assertiveness of moderate factions 
within the MB despite limited political access.  Limited political access and increasing 
repression fueled disputes within the MB but did not lead to a change of its moderate 
political approach of 1989. 
As the previous chapter showed, adjustments of the Election Law and 
bureaucratic regulations counterbalanced the initial success of the MB.181  However, the 
MB’s accommodative approach continued as its “pact” with the regime paid off.  The 
MB was able to establish privileges and expanded its influence to the ministerial level.  
The MB’s backing of the monarchy’s refusal to participate in the U.S.-led coalition in the 
Gulf War in 1991 gave King Hussein more flexibility to navigate through this crisis.  The 
King rewarded the MB’s alliance with cabinet positions and leading positions within the 
ministries of justice, education, religious affairs, and social development.182  
Nevertheless, the MB could neither push for an Islamist Prime Minister nor achieve its 
major objectives, such as segregation of sexes in schools, prohibition of alcohol, and 
abolishment of the peace talks with Israel. 
In addition, during the legislative periods between 1989 and 1993, Martial Law 
was suspended, the Political Parties Law was adjusted and the Press and Publications 
                                                 
181 The ministry of interior regulates political parties, unions, and professional organizations; the 
ministry of culture regulates all voluntary cultural organizations, ministry of social development regulates 
all charitable organizations. Wiktorowicz, Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan, 26–33. 
182 Jennifer Noyon, Islam, Politics and Pluralism: Theory and Practice in Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia 
and Algeria (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2003) 88, 134; Adams, Political Liberalization 
in Jordan: An Analysis of the State's Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, 513; and Rumman, The 
Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing 'Political Setback' Or 
Diminished Popularity, 22. 
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Law was created.183  Whereas these reforms imposed new liberties as well as new 
restrictions, the National Charter was a remarkable achievement of Jordan’s political 
liberalization.  All political groups inside and outside parliament supported the National 
Charter in 1991.  The MB took the opportunity to assure its commitment to Shari’ah in 
accordance with the National Charter.184 
Since the IAF became a political arm of the MB, its political agenda incorporated 
ends of the MB such as the implementation of Shari’ah and jihad against Israeli 
occupation in Palestine.  The IAF expanded its political agenda to specific liberties “as 
stipulated by Islam” and women’s rights in accordance with Shari’ah.185  In addition, the 
IAF was committed to a democratic consultative approach, which favored the principle of 
shura (consultation) since parliamentary democracy is not an end but a means to reach 
the IAF’s objectives.  The IAF sought “Islamization of legislation, regulating policies and 
practices according to the provisions of Islamic law (Shari'ah) … to achieve the desired 
reform and to build a model society.” 186 
The IAF did not specify its approach to and the characteristics of a “model 
society,” but responded with its agenda to major social and political concerns in the 
Jordanian public.  Needless to say, its political stance contradicted western worldviews in 
many regards, but appeals to the public desire for democracy and also for conservative 
Islamic values (see Table 1).  Consequently, the MB has opted for pragmatism rather than 
                                                 
183 The Political Parties Law legalized political parties on the one hand, but restricted political 
activities outside political parties on the other hand.  The law inhibited financial support from outside 
Jordan.  It sets the preconditions for excluding Palestinians living in Jordan from political participation who 
might choose the Palestinian citizenship.  The new Press and Publication Law brought more freedom for 
the media, but restricted critical news about the ruling elites.  Robinson, Defensive Democratization in 
Jordan, 392–393. 
184 Hourani et al., Islamic Action Front Party, 19.  
              The National Charter was built on (1) democratic rights, pluralism, tolerance, and equality; (2) 
private property rights; (3) balancing aspects of Jordanian vs. Arab nationalism (wataniya vs. qawmiyya) 
and Islam (state religion vs. secularism); (4) self-accusation with reference to grievances.  Despite its 
political status, it had no legal importance. Robinson, Defensive Democratization in Jordan, 393–397. 
185 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 164–165; and Hourani et 
al., Islamic Action Front Party, 19–20. 
186 According to the former leader of the IAF Ishaq Farhant: “…we believe in shura, in consultation 
and we think people should participate in taking decisions for the country.  So the parliamentary process 
can be Islamic.  But we are not after a certain model.  If the means are sufficient in satisfying our goals we 
can say they are Islamic. If they do not then we just reject them and try other sets of procedures.” Boulby 
and Voll, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945–1993, 130. 
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dogmatism.  Its vague political agenda leaves room for interpretation, which affects 
internal debates about an appropriate political approach.  Thus, substantial political 
access, political responsibility, and more liberalism might enhance political contention 
within and outside the MB. 
However, the early 1990s brought up major political changes, which affected the 
“pact” between the monarchy and the MB and created new opportunities for the MB.  As 
a consequence of Jordan’s policy of reconciliation with Israel in the early 1990s, the 
Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) was 
founded as a political platform of the Communist and Ba’thist parties and the IAF to 
coordinate political action.  Besides the HCCNOP, cooperation between these 
antagonistic political actors expanded into other organizations such as the National 
Committee for the Cancellation of the Israeli Trade Fair and the Anti-Normalization 
Committee of Jordan’s Professional Syndicates Association, as well as commonly 
organized protests in the streets.187 
The following repression by the regime had two effects.  First, it united the new 
cooperation between the parties, and second, it alienated the loyal IAF from the 
monarchy and erected factionalism within the IAF.  In contrast to a broad consensus 
about the political inclusion before the 1989 elections, the monarchy’s foreign and 
electoral policies opened the trenches within the IAF between “doves” (pro-inclusion) 
and “hawks” (contra-inclusion).  However, the dispute revolved around the arguments of 
being accountable for the regime’s policy on the one hand, or losing democratic 
credibility by withdrawing political participation on the other hand.  Finally, pragmatism 
prevailed since cooperation with other parties became a political necessity to achieve 
common ends.188  Moreover, the IAF enforced its democratic narrative inside and outside 
the party to justify its actions.  The internal dispute ended in a majority decision in favor 
                                                 
187 Clark, The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in 
Jordan, 539–547. 
188 Nevertheless, this pragmatism was absent after the election in 1989 when the MB could have 
formed a coalition with a majority of 60 percent which was one reason for the MB failure to achieve its 
objectives between 1989 and 1993. 
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of political participation, even if the peace treaty were to pass parliament.189  
Consequently, despite a major shift in Jordan’s foreign policy in particular with regard to 
the Palestine cause, the MB/IAF continued with its gradual approach in accordance with 
the “pact” with the monarchy.  The costs of confrontation were too high in comparison to 
the benefits that have served the MB well with regard to its organizational structures and 
social and political influence. 
However, since the MB’s rationale for inclusion paid, the regime feared losing 
control over the rise of the MB.  Besides selective repression against leading Islamists, 
the monarchy again adjusted the Election Law in advance of the parliamentary elections 
of 1993.190  The IAF lost six seats in the 1993 election, while loyal parties and candidates 
took over the majority in parliament.191  Nonetheless, the parliamentary elections in 1993 
confirmed the MB’s initial success in the elections of 1989 since it could mobilize its 
constituency in the cities by its well-organized structures.192  However, the amendments 
to the Election Law and the repression against monarchy critics fueled the dispute 
between “hawks” and “doves” about the IAF’s inclusion in addition to the controversial 
debate about the Jordanian policy of reconciliation with Israel.  These unresolved 
disputes weakened the IAF and led to their boycott of the parliamentary elections of 1997 
together with other major opposition parties.193 
The harmony between the monarchy and the MB of the early days was over.  The 
relationship did not recover in the remaining years of the era of King Hussein.  It became 
                                                 
189 Clark, The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in 
Jordan, 544–545; and Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 161–171, 
299. 
190 The case of Layth al-Shubaylat shows this clearly.  Layth al-Shubaylat investigated as a member of 
the Jordanian against corruption of the government.  The detainment and propaganda trial was a clear sign 
for every political Islamist who does not obey the “rules of the game.” 
191 Greenwood, Jordan's "New Bargain:" the Political Economy of Regime Security, 254–257. 
192 Robinson, Defensive Democratization in Jordan, 397–401. 
193 Clark, The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in 
Jordan, 547; and Hanna Y. Freij, "Liberalization, the Islamists, and the Stability of the Arab State: Jordan 
as a Case Study," The Muslim World 86, no. 1 (1996): 25–29. 
              As the justification for the retreat from political participation and a critique of the regime disregard 
of the MB’s role in the polity and society of Jordan, the MB published a political statement “Why did We 
Boycott?” Rumman, The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing 
'Political Setback' Or Diminished Popularity, 86. 
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clear that King Hussein’s loyal tribal Transjordan constituencies would remain the 
cornerstone of the monarchy’s legitimacy.  The monarchy’s support of the MB paid off 
as long as the MB could act as a counterweight against hostile political or Islamist 
strands.  The “pact” was challenged when political “shocks” were related to the core 
interests of both sides, which were antagonistic from the beginning.  Jordan’s economic 
vulnerability and its dependence on western aid forced the monarchy to make 
concessions in the Israeli-Palestine conflict, which stood in contrast to the MB political 
agenda.194  Nonetheless, the MB did not fundamentally change its pro-accommodative 
approach as moderate factions prevailed and the benefits with regard to the MB’s 
organizational stance in society outweighed the costs of confrontation.  The MB 
demonstrated its ideational responsiveness and pragmatism during cooperation in cross-
ideological alliances. 
C. THE NEW ERA OF KING ABDULLAH II (1999-2009) 
The “new” era of King Abdullah II brought about major changes in the 
relationship between the monarchy and the MB.  The monarchy’s alignment with the 
West reached a new level.  Military conflicts in the region and economic liberalization 
alongside a domestic policy of deliberalization, as well as a new approach to Hamas, 
have shaped the relationship between King Abdullah II and the MB.  The elections of 
2007 reached the lowest level of the relationship between the monarchy and the MB, 
which brought to mind a “couple that knows it is going to divorce.”195  Prominent issues 
such as women’s rights became a major area of contention as it contrasted the regime’s 
modern reform agenda with Islamist conservatism.  The IAF action and political agenda 
mirrors its conservative religious approach, as well as the new political situation since the 
reign of King Abdullah II.  However, the IAF’s political approach indicated neither 
moderation nor radicalization but continuity of its ambiguity. 
                                                 
194 Since the peace treaty with Israel, Jordan has received additional U.S. aid.  The U.S. has spent 
annually 560 million U.S. Dollars to support Jordan’s economy. Vogt, Der Gaza Krieg und seine Folgen: 
Realpolitik in einer verunsicherten Nachbarschaft, 12. 
195 Kaye et al., More Freedom, Less Terror?: Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World, 
76. 
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King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999 and attracted hope for more 
liberalization in Jordan.  Acknowledging the threat from political “shocks” outside the 
country and the monarchy’s vulnerable point of budget security, King Abdullah II aimed 
to dominate the reform process and draw public awareness to domestic challenges.  His 
plea for national unity and programs such as “Jordan First” in 2002, the founding of the 
Ministry of Development in 2003, and the 2006 National Agenda were points on the 
King’s roadmap to a modern Islamic state.196  However, as noted, the implementation of 
the King’s democratic rhetoric lagged behind economic reforms.197 
Nonetheless, the new monarchy attempted to maintain its democratic façade by 
focusing on certain prominent issues such as women’s rights.  Amendments to laws were 
drafted such as the “honor-crimes law,” the “quota” allocating seats for women in 
parliament and within political parties, and the Personal Status Law, giving women more 
divorce rights.198  As noted, the HCCNOP was the platform upon which a common 
approach in parliament was expected to be coordinated.  However, the IAF refused to 
discuss the amendments of the Personal Status Law and “honor-crimes” within the 
HCCNOP as these issues are bound to the jurisprudence of Shari’ah.  By contrast, the 
“quota” was put on the HCCNOP’s agenda as it became obvious that a majority in the 
HCCNOP would refuse it.  However, the IAF opposed all three amendments with 
religious reasoning using anti-western rhetoric.  Thus, substantial cross-ideological 
cooperation failed as ideological “red lines” of the IAF were crossed.  The MB’s view on 
women’s participation in politics was made clear in the 1989 elections when the MB 
criticized the candidacy of non-Islamist women.199 
                                                 
196 Besides economic development, these reforms aimed to reshape the political environment by 
encouraging the formation of stable political parties. Clark, The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: 
Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan, 546; Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso, Beyond the 
Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World, 54; and Perthes, Geheime Gärten, 315–316. 
197King Abdullah II Official Web site - King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan - Home Page and 
Germany Trade and Invest - Recherche Publikationen (accessed November 2009); Bank and 
Schlumberger, Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform, 46; and Greenwood, Jordan's 
"New Bargain:" the Political Economy of Regime Security, 248. 
198 Clark, The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in 
Jordan, 539–540. 
199 Clark and Schwedler, Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties, 300; and 
Clark, The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan, 555. 
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The IAF recognized women’s rights in accordance with Islamic virtues and 
officially allowed women to participate in politics and to take over political posts (except 
“head of state”).  Although women in the IAF have never run for elections, they have 
taken over responsibilities within the party structures as shown by the unprecedented 
success of six women in the IAF council elections of 2002.200  Women cooperated with 
organizations outside the party to engage in women related issues in society, while 
factions within the IAF have not been able to find a consensus on the role of women in 
society.  In addition, the internal party dispute about women’s rights blurred the fronts 
between “doves” and “hawks” (see Figure 5).201 
 
Figure 5.   Factions in the IAF According to Disputes about Women’s Rights202 
The dispute within the IAF about women’s rights indicates the heterogeneity of 
the IAF and its wide ideational spectrum.  Consequently, if repression decreases and 
political opportunities emerge, the IAF will be forced to develop a clear political 
                                                 
200 After the elections in 2003, the IAF cooperated with Hayat al-Musani, the first elected woman 
under the quota system.  Ryan, Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and 
Democracy. 
201 Clark and Schwedler, Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties, 301–307. 
202 Ibid., 297. 
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approach to major issues of concern, which affect political and religious views of its 
different factions.  In order to attract a plurality of Jordanians, moderate factions are 
supposed to spearhead the IAF’s political response and to facilitate moderation of former 
radical ideas, as they are not bound to dogmatic ideologies.  Therefore, moderation is 
supposed to take place beyond the camp of “soft-liners” (see Figure 5).  Furthermore, 
“hardliners” might splinter from the IAF, as the Liberation Party did in 1952, or cross the 
divide to radical strands.  Vice versa, if repression continues, factions are not likely to 
moderate their rigid worldview if political opportunities do not force them to do so.  The 
costs for an ongoing accommodation with the regime will increase if ideological 
concessions do not pay in terms of more political access.  Consequently, the regime’s 
policy of containment of Islamist opposition is counterproductive as it weakens the 
moderate forces. 
Along with King Abdullah’s policy of deliberalization, the monarchy’s approach 
to Hamas changed.  As noted, the foundation of Hamas in 1987 and Jordan’s policy of 
reconciliation with Israel in the early 1990s framed the antagonistic views between the 
regime and the MB with regard to the Palestine cause.  Abdullah’s expulsion of Hamas in 
1999 and his ban of Hamas after their success in the 2006 elections in Palestine were 
attempts to hamper Hamas’ influence in Jordan and to signal Jordan’s strong alliance 
with the West.203  Moreover, the war in Gaza in 2008 again showed the importance of 
Hamas and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the monarchy.204  The monarchy harshly 
criticized the Israeli War in Gaza in 2008 to warn Israel from unilateral actions, but also 
to appease pro-Hamas factions.205 
                                                 
203 Choucair-Vizoso, Illusive Reform: Jordan's Stubborn Stability, 57; and Schwedler, Faith in 
Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 198–199. 
204 Jordan insists on a separate Palestinian state.  The worst scenario is that Jordan will be forced to 
take over responsibility for the West Bank if Israeli forces retreat unilaterally.  The option that Jordan 
should be the hosting nation of all Palestinians (the “Jordan Solution”) is strongly rejected by the 
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The election of 2007 ended in a debacle for the IAF.  The internal disputes 
between “hawks” (pro-Hamas and contra-inclusion) and “doves” (disengagement with 
Hamas and pro-inclusion) about the monarchy’s approach to Hamas and the Election 
Law prevented substantial debates about the political program of the IAF.  In addition, 
unprecedented countermeasures by the monarchy against the MB’s network were 
perceived as having crossed “red lines” as the government took over the lead of the ICCS 
in July 2006.  Moreover, the regime’s media campaign to link terrorist activities with the 
MB has weakened the MB’s public support.206  Consequently, the regime’s policy in 
light of the 2007 elections weakened moderate factions within the IAF, as well as 
undermined substantial political programmatic debates and prospects of moderation of 
former radical ideas. 
The regime’s “attack” on the MB/IAF network forged antagonistic factions 
together to respond collectively to existential threats against its organizational structures.  
The election in April 2008 of the MB’s new General Guide, the prominent “hawk” 
Hamam Sa’id, showed the MB struggle for an appropriate response to King Abdullah’s 
policy of containment.207  Nevertheless, as noted, the election of a moderate head of the 
Shura Council, Abd al-Latif Arabiyat, shows the MB’s awareness with regard to its 
reputation in public and gives evidence for its strategic behavior.  The MB sends a clear 
signal with its new General Guide that the regime’s approach of confrontation might 
backfire as the MB might lose its role as a bulwark against radicalism and opt for a 
confrontational response.  The MB’s election of the moderate head of the Shura Council 
aims to take away the regime’s ability to justify its new course in public against a 
seemingly radicalizing MB.208 
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Figure 6.   The Decline of the MB Political Participation in Parliament from 1989 to 
2007 
The MB’s political influence in parliament has diminished significantly (see 
Figure 6).  Thus, the MB’s political inclusion is increasingly irrelevant and currently 
designed to signal the MB’s commitment to a gradual “democratic” approach.209  As 
chances for achieving political objectives inside state institutions are low, political action 
might shift to other channels such as professional organizations, which have become an 
effective means to protest against the monarchy’s policy since the mid-1990s.  Moreover, 
since new influential political parties in general, and Islamist parties in particular, have 
not emerged, the declining political attraction of the MB has left a vacuum that 
independent candidates are not able to fill.  Moreover, this trend has undermined the 
emergence of a competitive political environment within state institutions as a 
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prerequisite for Jordan’s path to democracy.  Finally, as political inclusion does not pay, 
radicalization of the MB and growing support for radical Islamist strands is likely.210  
 
Figure 7.   MB’s Online Declarations (2005-2007)211 
Nevertheless, the MB political decline also derived from internal disputes, which 
dominated substantial programmatic progress.  The IAF was not able to launch a political 
program, which brought up plausible solutions to important concerns of the Jordanian 
public as corruption, unemployment, and poverty.  Figure 7 shows the quantity of 
published online declarations by the MB between 2005 and 2007.  Foreign Affairs (red 
color) dominated domestic issues (green color), and even economic and social affairs 
played a minor role compared with internal organizational issues (gray color).  Thus, the 
IAF did not focus on the domestic needs of Jordanians, but on issues related to foreign 
affairs.  Nevertheless, although the MB responds to public trends with regard to foreign 
politics, domestic politics fell short.212  This misbalance reflects the failed attempt of the 
moderate camp to draw attention from foreign issues to domestic affairs.  This does not 
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mean that the radical camp, who criticizes the MB’s political accommodation with the 
regime, dominates the MB; but it shows that foreign affairs have gained in importance in 
light of major foreign incidents in Jordan’s neighborhood.  Consequently, while in 1993 
the political agenda focused on the Palestinian cause,213 the new geostrategic situation in 
Jordan’s neighborhood shaped the IAF’s agenda of 2009, which clearly contradicts 
western interests and does not exclude violence, as a means to achieve the IAF’s ends: 
(1) …strengthening the programs of resisting normalization of relations 
with Israel (2) …confronting Zionist infiltration and globalization that aim 
to impose further American hegemony over nations combating destructive 
organizations such as … Zionism …; (3) …the Palestinian cause is central 
to the nation's ideology, hence all capacities should be mobilized to 
support the Palestinian uprising and resistance as a vanguard for liberating 
Palestine; (4) …the brave Iraqi national resistance movement must receive 
every support possible to liberate Iraq from American occupation.214 
Table 2 shows the continuity of the IAF political agenda in the domestic political 
realm between 1993 and 2009.  Since Islam unites din wa dawla (religion and state), the 
IAF aims to follow a path to democracy as stipulated by Islam (Shari’ah).  Moreover, 
besides the IAF’s plea for social justice and corruption, the IAF’s commitment to 
democracy goes along with its demand for national unity against antagonistic 
Transjordan and Palestinian clientelism.  Consequently, as noted, the IAF’s political 
agenda aims to bridge rifts as far as the public opinion about Jordan’s political system 
and the Transjordan-Palestinian divide are concerned.  Nevertheless, on the one hand, the 
IAF’s political agenda has remained ambiguous in achieving core objectives since 1993.  
However, on the other hand, a radicalization with regard to domestic issues has not taken 
place.  The IAF emphasized its commitment to democracy and rejects compulsion in 
religious affairs (“securing religious freedom for all”).215  The ambiguity of the IAF is 
not surprising since political opportunities are missing and the IAF is not forced to take 
                                                 
213 “The Preparation of the nation for armed conflict (jihad) against the Zionist and imperialist 
enemies”, Hourani et al., Islamic Action Front Party, 30. 
214 IAF agenda of February 2009: United Nations Development Program, "Arab Parliaments: Arab 
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over political responsibility.  Moreover, the ambiguity of the IAF derives from the 
challenge to merge religious dogmatism with political pragmatism.  From a western point 
of view, the IAF’s ambiguity with regard to its political ends in Jordan and its support for 
violence against Israel and western forces in Iraq creates a “gray zone” of uncertainty 
about their real goals.216  However, the comparison of the IAF’s political agenda of 1993 
vs. 2009 shows that core domestic objectives have stayed unchanged and, therefore, do 
not indicate a radicalization while political opportunities are missing.  The IAF’s 
aggressive foreign political stance reflects trends of Jordan’s public opinion and takes 
into account major political changes in Jordan’s neighborhood driven by the West. 
The resumption of Islamic life and the application of Islamic Shari’ah 
in all fields. 
Shari’ah 
1993 /  
2009 
Islamization of legislation, regulating policies and practices according 
to the provisions of Islamic law (Shari'ah) and confronting attempts to 
Westernize our thinking and morality are priorities on the party's 
agenda to achieve the desired reform and to build a model society. 
Exerting efforts toward achieving national unity and liberty, as well as 
confronting imperialist and foreign influence. 
National Unity 
1993 /  
2009 
Confronting all calls and policies that undermine national unity and 
adopting a national program for enhancing that unity is a matter of 
priority for the Party. 
Achieving national unity and establishing a system based on 
democracy and Shura (consultation). The defense of human dignity, 
liberty, and freedoms in general. 
Democracy 
1993 /  
2009 Defending citizens' public freedoms and their constitutional rights, 
increasing their awareness of those rights and releasing the people's 
potential capacities to achieve comprehensive development. 
Table 2.   Core Objectives Comparison of Political Agenda of the IAF in 1999 vs. 
2009217 
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The accommodative relationship between the monarchy and the MB has served 
both sides over many decades.  The MB took advantage of its privileged stance during 
the “golden era” between 1945 and 1989.  However, the monarchy’s policy in this period 
dismantles its miscalculation of the costs of the MB’s inclusion.  While the monarchy has 
supported the MB’s accumulation of resources, political inclusion of the MB has become 
more risky for the monarchy in the light of Jordan’s pro-western policy.218  Since 
political competition by political parties is missing, the monarchy has countered the 
strength of the MB by bureaucratic limitation and repression. 
The MB is in danger of losing its role as a counterweight to radical Islamist 
strands.  King Abdullah II seemed to be convinced that he is able to handle the threat of 
radical Islamism with Jordan’s security apparatus and his pro-western policy.  In 
addition, the monarchy’s “attack” on the social network of the MB in 2007 was 
unmistakable and might provoke radical counter actions.219  The development of the 
“triad” monarchy, MB and Hamas against the background of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has major implications for the future relationship between the monarchy and the 
MB.220  As the MB has not yet decided how it should respond to the “new” era of King 
Abdullah II, it faces the threat of being perceived as politically irrelevant by the 
monarchy and the people.  The “electoral game” of the MB will completely lose its 
importance if the MB does not push for more political participation. 
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Political engineering and social control have hampered democratic progress and 
weakened the conditions of moderation of radical ideas.  The lack of political vigor of the 
MB raises doubts about whether it is able to take over significant political responsibility 
in the near future should political opportunities emerge.  The MB has missed developing 
answers to current political challenges while struggling in ideological trenches.  
Moreover, in accordance with the public opinion, the moderate strand of the MB argues 
that the hostile environment in the neighborhood of Jordan does not allow for a rapid 
political change.221  Nevertheless, the MB’s ambiguity mainly derives from missing 
opportunities to take over political responsibility and the challenge to merge different 
religious views with political pragmatism. 
Collectively, the MB acts strategically based on rational pragmatist 
considerations, balancing the costs and benefits of their political action and their 
cooperation with the regime.  Despite limited political participation, moderation has 
taken place when the MB was forced to make alliances with competing political forces to 
achieve their ends.  Thus, political competition while strengthening civil society, political 
parties, and parliament are crucial for a successful political inclusion of the MB.222  
Moreover, internal disputes about religious affairs and the general question of 
cooperation with the regime point to the diversity and the changing boundaries of 
justifiable action within the MB.  Therefore, moderation is likely with regard to multiple 
factions in the MB besides the camp of “hardliners” even with reference to ideological 
core issues such as women’s rights.223 
Finally, substantial inclusion of the MB will bode well for Jordan’s path to 
democracy if legislation and state institutions set the prerequisites for political 
competition.  A radicalization of the MB’s political agenda between 1993 and 2009 has 
not taken place despite repression and limited political access.  Despite changes in the 
balance of power between moderate and radical factions, the MB has remained 
                                                 
221 Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents and Institutions, 83; 
and Lucas, Deliberalization in Jordan, 138. 
222 Denoeux, The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam, 78–80. 
223 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 21–25; and Clark and 
Schwedler, Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties, 297. 
 82
committed to democracy in accordance with Shari’ah.  The MB’s political agenda gives 
evidence of their mainstream approach embracing religious conservative and reformist 
strands in society.  Its aggressive foreign political objectives give no evidence for a 
radical ideology, but show the general Muslim concerns about western policy in the 
Muslim world.  Vice versa, since the MB does not clearly reject its direct or indirect 
support for violence outside the borders of Jordan, it is perceived as a threat to the West 
and its allies.  This perception is crucial with regard to western approaches to Jordan, 
which refrain from pushing the Jordanian regime for more political liberalization and the 
inclusion of Islamists in the political process.  Thus, the next chapter explores how U.S. 
and EU assistance to Jordan shapes Jordan’s path to democracy, as well as political 
opportunities for the MB and responds to moderate Islamists in Jordan as the remaining 
substantial political force in Jordan. 
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IV. U.S. AND EU ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN 
Jordan’s artificial creation in the aftermath of the first World War, its scarce 
resources, and its weak economic basis have shaped its dependence on foreign aid, 
“petrodollars” from states in the Gulf, and remittances from Jordanians working outside 
the country.  Jordan’s rentier economy used to be the source of a patrimonial distribution 
of social welfare and privileges that secures the legitimacy of the Hashemite Kingdom.224  
Along with Jordan’s economic decline of the 1980s and its reconciliation with Israel in 
the 1990s, Jordan’s pro-western stance has characterized its foreign policy.225 
Consequently, Jordan’s path to democracy is supposed to be paved by western 
protagonists such as the U.S. and the EU.226  However, as Chapter II showed, 
liberalization during the 1990s stagnated and civil liberties have been reduced since King 
Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999.  Despite foreign aid, Jordan’s Freedom House 
rating, which has not increased since 1975, declined in 2008 and it recently downgraded 
to “not free.”227 
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The debate about foreign assistance to the Middle East is ongoing and driven by 
the role of the U.S. in the region.  The liberal camp argues that transforming autocracies 
into democracies, as the “third wave” in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America and in 
Europe showed, has served U.S. interests.  Former autocratic rulers should become 
accountable for their action, as they have to care about the well-being of their people.  
Since 9/11, and according to UN Arab Human Development Reports, it was widely 
believed that terrorism derives from oppressive regimes in the Middle East and a lack of 
democracy.228  Finally, radical Islamism became the main concern that must be contained 
by spreading democracy as a world value.229 
By contrast, the realist approach to the Middle East highlights the stability and 
security in the region.  Realists insist that democratic transitions are open-ended 
processes and can be costly.  The resurgence of Islamism threatens the status quo that has 
served western interests ever since.  A prudent approach to the Middle East should reject 
a moral overreach.230  Moreover, realist argue, “although standard measures of 
democracy promotion may well consolidate or even revitalize authoritarian rule, more 
radical techniques may produce as much good as evil.”231  Terrorism will even flourish 
during transitions and political instability if institutions are weak.  The chances of 
western actors to promote democracy are marginal since their credibility is low with 
regard to their colonial era and hypocritical standards.  Vice versa, elections are just a 
means to attract foreign aid and to maintain a democratic façade.232 
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This context raises three questions: (1) What are the commonalities and 
differences between the U.S. and the EU approach to Jordan?  (2) How did U.S. and EU 
assistance shape political opportunities in Jordan?  (3) Are the U.S. and the EU willing to 
push a democratic process in Jordan that favors political inclusion of moderate Islamist 
organizations? 
This chapter compares and contrasts U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan with 
reference to its effects on political opportunities as elaborated in Chapter II.  Therefore, 
first, Section A explores the rationales of U.S. and EU foreign policy in general, which 
provide the basis for strategic concepts and means as applied by U.S. and EU assistance 
to Jordan.  Section B assesses the effects of U.S. and EU strategic concepts and means on 
political opportunities in Jordan, and examines the U.S. and EU responsiveness to 
moderate Islamist organizations. 
A. RATIONALES OF U.S. AND EU FOREIGN POLICY 
The ends of U.S. and EU foreign policy share more commonalities than 
differences.  With regard to security threats of the twenty-first century, both the U.S. and 
EU share a common assessment.  The conclusions and rationales of their foreign policies 
differ substantially along with geostrategic considerations, different interests in Jordan, 
and available capabilities.  Thus, the perspectives of the EU and the U.S. are not 
homogenous.  While the EU focuses on the Mediterranean in its neighborhood, the U.S. 
takes a broader perspective on the Middle East concentrating its efforts in the Gulf.  
Nevertheless, the EU depends on the U.S. to provide security in its neighborhood, since 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial for peace and stability in the EU neighborhood 
where the U.S. rather than the EU is able to shape the peace process.233 
Interests of the U.S. in the Middle East have changed due to the paradigm shift 
after the Cold War.  The containment of Islamism and terrorism by promoting democracy 
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has become a main concern.234  Democracy promotion, by peaceful means or by force, 
should remove authoritarian rule, combat the violation of human rights and terrorism, 
foster economic development and prospering economic relationships between the West 
and the Middle East, and finally enhance the countries’ abilities of solving domestic and 
interstate conflicts peacefully.235  Nevertheless, the current U.S. administration seeks a 
more pragmatic and quieter reconciliatory approach announced by the U.S. President in 
Cairo and Accra in 2009 and as the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2010 stipulates.236  
On December 10, 2009 in Oslo, the U.S. President stated that: 
...within America, there has long been a tension between those who 
describe themselves as realists or idealists - a tension that suggests a stark 
choice between the narrow pursuit of interests or an endless campaign to 
impose our values around the world.  I reject these choices.  I believe that 
peace is unstable where citizens are denied the right to speak freely or 
worship as they please; choose their own leaders or assemble without 
fear.237 
Nevertheless, the schism between the idealistic U.S. rhetoric and the realist conduct of 
U.S. policy in the past led to a significant decline of credibility in the Arab world and 
fueled anti-American resentments.238 
However, U.S. interests have not fundamentally changed.  The constant 
determinant of U.S. policy in the Middle East is free access to strategic resources in the 
Gulf and the commitment to a secure and stable environment for Israel.  Jordan’s policy 
                                                 
234 Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 63–74. 
235 See debate between Carothers and Paula J. Dobriansky (Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs 
in 2003); Ibid., 75–82; McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, 147; and Jason Ralph, "American 
Democracy and Democracy Promotion," International Affairs 77, no. 1 (January, 2001), 215–217. 
236 See "The National Security Strategy 2010," 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed May 29, 
2010); Thomas Carothers, "Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance: The Challenge of USAID," Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (2009). 
237 The White House, "Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize," White 
House.Gov Press Office Feed (2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/feed/press/%2A (accessed January 20, 
2010). 
238 Marina Ottaway, "The Problem of Credibility," in Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in 
the Middle East, eds. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace: Brookings Institution Press, distributor, 2005), 173–181. 
 87
of reconciliation was therefore greeted generously by the U.S.239  Despite some ups and 
downs in U.S.-Jordan relations during the era of King Hussein from 1957 to 1999, Jordan 
has become an important “bridgehead” in combating terrorism since 9/11.240  Jordan’s 
engagement in the War on Terror was met as “annual U.S. assistance to Jordan has more 
than quadrupled.”241  As the next section elaborates, Jordan took over an important role 
in supporting nation building in Iraq and aims to contribute to the solution of the Palestine-
Israeli conflict.  Since King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999, Jordan’s alliance with 
the U.S. has been unquestioned.  Nonetheless, with reference to the resurgence of Islamism in 
Jordan, U.S. interests in Jordan might be challenged if the MB gains a significant voice in the 
political decision making process in Jordan as the previous chapters show.  Thus, from a 
realist perspective, the benefits of Jordan’s status quo have a higher weight than significant 
political changes, which might confront U.S. interests. 
While public interest has focused on the U.S., the EU reached its prominence as a 
quieter worldwide political actor committed to a multilateral approach.  The EU’s source of 
power derives from its multifaceted civil capabilities and the diversity of its member states.  
However, the EU’s strength incorporates inherently weak points, which stem from manifold 
interests of its member states.  The debate about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
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and the Union of the Mediterranean in 2008 during the French presidency sheds light on a 
missing unity of effort and a resurgence of nationalization of European foreign policy.242 
However, the EU’s economic and civil strength reflects the EU’s normative 
power within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  The EU’s 
contribution in ending the Cold War and promoting the “third wave” of democracy in 
Europe is, first and foremost, a result of its attractiveness with reference to democratic, 
legal, and economic standards and benefits.  However, does this attractiveness apply for 
states in the Mediterranean neighborhood, which do not have a perspective of becoming 
an EU member state?243 
The EU’s need to provide security in its neighborhood differs substantially from 
the motivation of the U.S. approach to the Middle East.  The EU’s geographic proximity 
to the Middle East, as well as the close historic and economic links between the Southern 
European and Arab states in the Mediterranean region, shape EU interests in the Middle 
East.  The EU enlargement between 2004 and 2007 (e.g., Rumania and Bulgaria), 
prospects of a further enlargement in the Balkans, and last but not least Turkey’s status as 
an EU-membership candidate highlights the EU security interests in the Middle East.  
Thus, the remarkable EU enlargement from fifteen to twenty-seven member states 
between 2004 and 2007 pushed a new thinking about security in the European 
neighborhood including the Mediterranean states of the Middle East.244  However, the 
question is: How can security be provided to the European neighborhood if states such as 
                                                 
242 The “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” was launched under the French presidency.  It aims to 
institutionalize the multilateral approach of the European Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process 
1995) in order to enhance cooperation and co-ownership with its neighboring states (including Jordan).  
See next section and for further information:  European Union, "European Union (EU) and the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership," http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (accessed April 
6, 2010, 
243 Annegret Bendiek and Heinz Kramer, "Die EU als globaler Akteur: Unklare Strategien, Diffuses 
Leitbild," SWP-Studie (2009); and Jolyon Howorth, ed., Security and Defense Policy in the European 
Union (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 89–91, 133–134. 
244 Winfried Veit, "Avantgarde und Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik - Für ein Europa der 
konzentrischen Kreise," Internationale Politikanalyse Europäische Politik (2006); and Bendiek and 
Kramer, Die EU als Globaler Akteur: Unklare Strategien, Diffuses Leitbild, 11–15. 
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Iran or Iraq are not included in the EU approach and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
stagnates as the U.S. is not willing or able to push the peace process?245 
The EU success in spreading democracy and stability in the former states of the 
East Block shaped the EU’s self-confidence as a civilian normative power and its 
approach to its Mediterranean neighborhood.  Moreover, the increasing integration and 
effectiveness of European capabilities according to the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 is supposed 
to provide a necessary means for a comprehensive approach to security challenges.246  
Where does the need to provide security in the EU’s neighborhood end?  While the EU 
focuses on the Mediterranean, a coherent strategic approach has to incorporate security 
threats, which are interlinked and derive from the entire Middle East as the relationship 
between Iran, Syria, and Hizballah, as well as between Jordan and Iraq before and after 
the Iraq War of 2003 shows.  Whereas the EU focuses mainly on the Mashreq and the 
Maghreb, the U.S. takes up a Greater Middle East perspective, including the Gulf and the 
East (Afghanistan and Pakistan).247 
However, the EU’s goals are just as ambitious as those of the U.S., as the EU 
Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 shows.  The main difference between the EU and the 
U.S. derives from their geostrategic perspectives and the acknowledgment of a multi-
polar world.  In contrast to the U.S., the EU is directly affected by its security concerns of 
its neighborhood in the Middle East such as human trafficking and immigration in 
conjunction with organized crime as well as Islamist terrorism.  The underlying rationale 
of the EU’s strategic approach is “to promote a ring of well governed countries to the 
                                                 
245 Aliboni, The Mediterranean and the Middle East. Narrowing Gaps in the Transatlantic 
Perspective, 2. 
246 Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, merges the competences of the formerly 
separated three pillars into areas of shared competence such as (a) internal market, (b) social policy, for the 
aspects defined in this Treaty, and (c) economic, social, and territorial cohesion.  A Common Security and 
Foreign Policy (CSFP) is supposed to be more consistent as the responsibilities of the High Representative 
of CSFP increased.  European Union, "Treaty of Lisbon," Official Journal of the European Union 50, no.  
C 306 (December 17, 2007): 1–272. 
247 Edward Burke, Ana Echagüe and Richard Youngs, "Why the European Union Needs a 'Broader 
Middle East' Policy," FRIDE Working Paper 93 (February 12, 2010), 1–10; and Roberto Aliboni, 
"Brennpunkt Mittelmeer: Südmediterrane Herausforderungen. Antworten der EU-Staaten sind gefragt," 
http://www.internationalepolitik.de/ip/archiv/jahrgang1996/februar1996/sudmediterrane-
herausforderungen--antworten-der-eu-staaten-sind-gefragt.html (accessed April 30, 2010). 
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East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can 
enjoy close and cooperative relations…;” however, trying to confront challenges globally 
as they occur.  Whereas the NSS reflects the consensus of an administration of a 
sovereign state, the ESS is a multinational document and depends on the “common 
dominator” of all EU member states.  Thus, the abstraction of objectives and 
commitments of both strategies differ.248 
Nevertheless, the EU and the U.S. security strategies share common ends based 
on a common threat assessment focusing on (1) proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, (2) terrorism, organized crime, and failing states, and (3) energy security.  
While both the U.S. and the EU emphasize the importance of multilateral frameworks 
and the commitment to a comprehensive approach, the EU points to its civil power 
whereas the U.S. highlights the importance of its military force and its willingness to 
maintain its worldwide military superiority.249  Nonetheless, while the current U.S. 
administration has moved away from the “Bush doctrine” to a multilateral approach as 
stipulated by the NSS 2010, the U.S. global perspective as the sole military superpower 
has remained as the U.S. President put it: 
America's commitment to global security will never waver.  But in a world 
in which threats are more diffuse, and missions more complex, America 
cannot act alone.  America alone cannot secure the peace.  But, I - like any 
head of state - reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend 
my nation.250 
Finally, it is striking that while the EU faces security threats from its 
Mediterranean neighborhood, it is convinced that security threats need to be countered, 
                                                 
248 European Union, "European Security Strategy 2003," 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed April 20, 2010). 
249 See "The National Security Strategy 2002," http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/ (accessed April 21, 2010); "The National Security Strategy 2006," 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ (accessed April 21, 2010); and The National 
Security Strategy 2010. 
              See European Union, European Security Strategy 2003; and European Union at the United 
Nations, "EU@UN - Report on Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a 
Changing World," http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8370_en.htm (accessed December 13, 
2009). 
250 The White House, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize. 
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first and foremost, by civilian capabilities.  This rationale is shaped by two 
circumstances, which derive from the EU’s “architecture.”  First, a complex 
intergovernmental political-institutional framework drives the EU’s CFSP while civilian 
diplomats and the strong bureaucratic apparatus of the European Commission prevail 
over military representations.  Military power is “downgraded” to an instrument equal to 
civilian power.  Second, military capabilities remain part of EU member states’ 
sovereignty.  Member states provide military capabilities based on common decisions, 
but they do not have to.  Therefore, they might reject a military contribution although 
they support an EU’s military intervention.251 
By contrast, the U.S. is willing to defend its strategic interests in the Middle East 
if necessary by the use of force, although it is not threatened by security challenges as in 
the case of the EU.  Even the dependence of European member states on natural 
resources in the Middle East is substantially higher than the U.S.  Whereas the EU 
imports 45 percent of its oil demand from the Middle East, only 17 percent of U.S. oil 
imports originate from this instable region.252  In comparison to the EU’s bureaucratic 
institutional power (foremost the European commission), which maintains the coherence 
of the CFSP, the U.S. Department of State lacks institutional power and capabilities to 
conduct its policy without relying on well developed military structures around the world.  
The report on 9/11 makes it clear that the: 
State [Department] came into the 1990s overmatched by the resources of 
other departments and with little support for its budget either in Congress 
or in the President’s Office of Management and Budget...Increasingly, the 
embassies themselves were overshadowed by powerful regional 
commanders in chief reporting to the Pentagon.253 
                                                 
251 See for detailed information about the European framework and the use of military and civilian 
power in Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, 61–91, 124–134. 
252 EurActiv Network, "Geopolitics of EU Energy Supply," 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/geopolitics-eu-energy-supply/article-142665 (accessed April 30, 2010). 
253 "The 9/11 Commission Report." http://www.9-11commission.gov (accessed April 24, 2010); 
Kennon H. Nakamura and Susan B. Epstein, Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy 
(RL34141) Congressional Research Service, [2007]), www.crs.org (accessed April 10, 2010). 
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Another difference between the rationales of EU and U.S. foreign policy derives 
from the assessment of promoting democracy.  Whereas the U.S. has advocated an active 
role in promoting democracy as part of its grand strategy including regime change that 
favors human freedom and leads to prosperity and stability, the EU opted for an approach 
that is mainly characterized by a strong technocratic top-down assistance.  The EU 
believes that democracy evolves from within, moderated by strong institutions.  
However, the downside of the EU approach is the lack of clarity caused by multiple 
interests of EU member states and contradictions between the EU’s pursuit of 
maintaining stability and democratic ends.254  Differences between the U.S. and EU 
approach might diminish in the future, as the current U.S. administration has moved away 
from a rhetorically overloaded debate about democracy promotion to a more pragmatic 
stance as the NSS 2010 shows.255  Nevertheless, in accordance with John Winthrop’s 
paradigm, “America will always be a voice for those aspirations that are universal” as the 
U.S. President recently stated.256 
The dispute about the Iraq War in 2003 summarizes the different rationales 
between U.S. and EU policy to the Middle East.  It also shows the diversity of available 
means and the political willingness to use military force to meet today’s security 
challenges.  Nevertheless, the civilian strength of the EU and the military strength of the 
U.S. could complement one another in a multi-polar world if the U.S. values the EU’s 
civil strength.  Vice versa, the EU should value U.S. capabilities and willingness to use 
military force as the continuation of foreign politics with other means as the Prussian 
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz put it.  However, a common transatlantic approach 
                                                 
254 Richard Youngs, "Europe's Uncertain Pursuit of Middle East Reform," in Uncharted Journey: 
Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, eds. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace : Brookings Institution Press, distributor, 2005), 245–247; 
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to the Middle East is a significant challenge as far as differences with regard to political 
structures and the role of domestic politics on both sides of the Atlantic are concerned.257 
Collectively, the U.S. and the EU share common ends based on a common threat 
assessment.  However, despite a more pragmatist U.S. approach of the current U.S. 
administration, differences between the U.S. and EU foreign policy to the Middle East 
derive from different geostrategic imperatives, available civilian and military capabilities, 
and views on democracy promotion.  Jordan is part of the “outer ring” of the European 
neighborhood, which should bolster the EU’s security.  By contrast, the U.S. views 
Jordan as its bridgehead to the Gulf, and as a reliable neighbor of the U.S.’s most 
important strategic partner, Israel.  Consequently, vice versa, from the perspective of 
Jordan, the EU provides the access to a closer relationship with Europe and the states in 
the Mediterranean, while Jordan’s relationship with the U.S. enables Jordan to address its 
vital security interests in Iraq and Palestine.  Thus, different approaches to Jordan are not 
motivated by different ends, but by different strategic rationales and capabilities, which 
determine concepts and means as the next section elaborates. 
B. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND MEANS 
This chapter explores how strategic concepts and means of the U.S. and the EU 
shape political opportunities and the responsiveness of the U.S. and the EU to Islamist 
movements as examined in the previous chapters.  Besides manifold initiatives at the 
grassroots level, this chapter focuses on the major strands of U.S. and EU assistance to 
Jordan, and their effects on the behavior of the Jordanian regime. 
                                                 
257 The relationship with Jordan’s neighbor Israel is a case in point.  While the EU approach to Israel 
is foremost an issue of its foreign affairs, U.S. domestic politics significantly drives U.S. policy to Israel.  
The bureaucratic momentum in the EU with regard to a six-month rotation of the EU presidency has shaped 
EU policy ever since and is more significant than in the U.S.  The EU complex decision-making process 
and the role of its institutions (European Commission) maintain a high continuity of the EU’s foreign 
policy.  Volker Perthes, "The Advantages of Complementarity: US and European Policies towards the 
Middle East Process," in Germany and the Middle East Interests and Opinions, ed. Volker Perthes, 
Heinrich Böll Foundation in co-operation with Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2002), 61–75; Robert J. 
Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy," Policy Sciences, no. 4 (1973): 475, 486–487; 
and John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," SSRN Working 
Paper Series (2006). 
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In addition to the complexity of the European framework of assistance, every EU 
member state provides a pattern of assistance in Jordan, which follows certain political, 
cultural, or economic motivations.258  Consequently, knowing the shortcomings of 
limiting the scope of foreign assistance, this chapter focuses on initiatives and programs 
under the lead of the EU.  The same logic applies to U.S. assistance to Jordan.  Besides 
manifold state-funded organizations and initiatives of the U.S., this chapter focuses on 
the main strands of U.S. assistance to Jordan. 
Whereas the U.S. and the EU differ in their approach with regard to quantity and 
military assistance, economic development and security issues is the common point of 
main effort.  The U.S. and the EU approach apply to the conditionality of good 
governance, human rights, and democracy.  Nevertheless, the U.S. and the EU opted for 
an approach that maintains the status quo, acknowledging the threat of unintended 
consequences of political change in Jordan.  Thus, the realist approach prevailed over 
liberal conditionality.  Therefore, political opportunities are not likely to be created by the 
U.S. and the EU.  Neither the U.S. nor the EU supports moderate Islamist organizations 
explicitly or implicitly.  The western version of a modern Islamic political approach does 
not reflect the reality in Jordan with regard to the MB as the most powerful moderate 
Islamist mainstream organization.  Nevertheless, the EU is more willing to engage with 
Islamists than is the U.S. at present. 
1. The EU Approach 
The complexity of the EU and its institutions goes along with its manifold 
political initiatives, agreements, and programs.  Table 3 provides an overview of the main 
strands of the EU/Jordan relationship.  This section focuses on funds, strategies, and their 
implementations and how they affect the political development in Jordan and whether 
they create political opportunities for opposing political forces such as the MB. 
                                                 
258 In addition, Germany has taken over commitments regarding alleviation of poverty and structural 
reforms with regard to good governance and democracy and fostering civil society.  Educational reforms 
and not least the founding of the German-Jordanian University in 2005 demonstrate Germany’s efforts in 
Jordan.  See European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Strategic Paper 2002/2006 and 
2007/2013.  Commission of the European Union, "Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik - 
Referenzdokumente," http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_de.htm (accessed April 13, 2010). 
 95
Despite the wide spectrum of EU assistance to Jordan, economic and security 
interests dominate.  Although EU assistance acknowledges the obstacles of Jordan’s 
democratization as shown in Chapter II, it primarily addresses economic progress and 
security as main facilitators of a stable and modern Jordan.  The EU treats Jordan as a 
promising case in the region reconciling modernity with Islam.  Assistance is conditioned 
in theory, but it is not used as an instrument to push the monarchy for a political opening, 
which might favor Islamist organizations.  Instead, the EU shares the economic reform 
agenda of King Abdullah II and the risk assessment of the Jordanian regime with regard 
to Islamism.  Finally, the EU remains ambiguous regarding more political influence by 
moderate Islamist organizations such as the MB. 
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Table 3.   EU Assistance to Jordan within the Scope of EMP and ENP 
The EU’s contractual relationship with Jordan dates back to 1977.  However, 
since then the EU has changed significantly.  In 1995, the EU launched the European 
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) with eight Arab countries including Jordan and Israel 
to create a buffer of stable states in the southern flank of the EU (Barcelona Process).259  
                                                 
259 The participants of the EU summit were twenty-five EU member states, ten Mediterranean 
neighbor states such as Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Israel; two observing states Libya, Mauretania, and three EU candidates such as Bulgaria, Croatia, 
and Rumania. 
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However, the EMP’s effectiveness with regard to the increasing illegal migration from 
North Africa and terrorism in the Middle East and Europe was contested.  The EMP’s 
multilateral approach, which aimed to create multinational institutions in the region to 
enhance economic, security, and cultural cooperation, failed, since the unity of effort 
between the cooperating states could not be achieved not least because of disputes 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.260 
Moreover, the EMP reached its limits with reference to security issues, which 
were the point of main effort of the Barcelona Declaration.  The EU had to acknowledge 
that any attempts to provide security in the near neighborhood of the EU go beyond the 
scope of the EMP.  The EU strategy in its neighborhood had to incorporate states such as 
Iran and Iraq and be coordinated with U.S. strategy.  Even more important were the 
concerns of the Arab states, which argued that any progress in security and stability 
depend on Israeli concession in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  However, cooperation between 
Arab states and Israel within the EMP did not take place.  In addition, the incentives the 
EU was willing to provide were not attractive and the EMP was deemed an asymmetric 
partnership.  The EU Association Agreements (AA) of 2002, which mainly focused on 
economic cooperation funded by the Mediterranean Economic Development Area 
(MEDA), supported this judgment since partner states confronted many negative 
consequences in the economic and social realms.  In addition, the AA missed formulating 
clear objectives with regard to good governance and human rights as well as a system of 
evaluation of the reform progress.  Thus, commitments by both sides (the EU and partner 
states) were vague and abstract.261 
                                                 
260 Muriel Asseburg, "Demokratieförderung in der arabischen Welt - Hat der partnerschaftliche 
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261 Muriel Asseburg, "Demokratieförderung in der arabischen Welt - Hat der partnerschaftliche 
Ansatz der Europäer versagt?"; Winfried Veit, "Avantgarde und Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik - Für 
ein Europa der konzentrischen Kreise," Internationale Politikanalyse Europäische Politik (2006); Annegret 
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Studie (2009); Kausch and Youngs, The End of the 'Euro-Mediterranean Vision', 965; Youngs, European 
Approaches to Security in the Mediterranean, 414; Burke, Echagüe and Youngs, Why the European Union 
Needs a 'Broader Middle East' Policy, 1–10; and Aliboni, Brennpunkt Mittelmeer: Südmediterrane 
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Recognizing the shortcoming of the EMP, the Joint Declaration of the Paris 
Summit for the Mediterranean of July 13, 2008 (“Union for the Mediterranean” (UfM)), 
including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, and 
Tunisia, aimed to revitalize the EMP by creating permanent common institutions at the 
political level for trustful cooperation and co-ownership stressed by common projects.262  
However, the effectiveness of the revitalization has not yet been tested.  Nevertheless, the 
success of the UfM is threatened due to the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict in conjunction with the EU’s decision to invite the Arab League.  The structure 
of the secretariat of the UfM, which executes common decisions by the Union, misses 
any northern European presence, which could mediate emerging disputes in light of the 
Israeli-Palestine conflict.  Consequently, as Aliboni put it, the UfM might become 
hostage to the Israeli-Palestine conflict.263  Moreover, instead of a comprehensive 
approach to the region, and according to national interests of some EU member states 
(foremost France), the EU opted for a regionalization of its approach, which prevailed 
over cooperation with other important actors in the Gulf or the U.S.  The EU’s rhetoric 
with regard to its normative power in promoting human rights, good governance, and 
democracy lagged behind efforts with regard to technical assistance and security.  In this 
context, the EU acknowledgement of the importance of political Islam in the region falls 
short.264 
In contrast to the multilateral approach of the EMP, the ENP comprises manifold 
instruments designed for each partnership in the framework of the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP).  The ENP was launched in 2004 as bilateral partnership 
with countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), Mashreq (Libya, Egypt), 
                                                 
262 These projects are de-pollution of the Mediterranean, maritime and land highways, civil protection 
(with regard to effects of climate change), alternative energies, higher education and research (Euro-
Mediterranean University with its seat in Slovenia), business development assisting the existing entities.  
"Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean under the Co-Presidency of the President of 
the French Republic and the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt," 
http://www.eu2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/07/0713_declaration_de_paris/Joint_declaration_of
_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf (accessed April 14, 2010). 
263 Aliboni, The Mediterranean and the Middle East. Narrowing Gaps in the Transatlantic 
Perspective, 22–23. 
264 Kausch and Youngs, The End of the 'Euro-Mediterranean Vision', 965, 974–975. 
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the Middle East (Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Syria), the 
Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), and Eastern Europe (Moldova, 
Ukraine and Belarus).  The close bilateral cooperation of the ENP should be more 
effective than the multilateral EMP in addressing the challenges mentioned in the ESS 
such as terrorism, proliferation, migration, organized crime, and energy security by 
fostering good governance and economic, social, and environmental progress.  
Nevertheless, as the EMP, the ENP is highly contested with regard to its reluctance to 
push for reforms despite its wide spectrum of capabilities.265 
According to the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper,  
the privileged relationship with neighbors will build on mutual 
commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of 
law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority 
rights, the promotion of good neighborly relations, and the principles of 
market economy and sustainable development.266 
Financial and technical assistance by the European Neighborhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI) and Jordan’s participation in “Generalized System of Preferences” 
mainly focused on economic assistance.  This approach should enable Jordan’s access to 
the EU’s internal market and the World Trade Organization (WTO), a common market 
and the reduction of trade barriers.  Nevertheless, the restructuring of EU funding and the 
creation of ENPI gave the EU more flexibility to respond to main areas of concern 
besides Jordan’s economic development.267 
The core of the ENP is the implementation of Action Plans (AP), which are 
designed in accordance with the Common Strategy Papers (CSPs) to provide a 
contractual privileged partnership between the EU and each partner state over a period of 
five years to assist economic and political transitions.  As in the case of Jordan, the AP 
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was created along with Jordan’s reform agenda to emphasize Jordan’s “ownership.” 268  
The elements of the AP draw from the spectrum of the EU competence of external 
relations and highlight the EU’s technocratic top-down assistance.  They incorporate: (1) 
political dialogue and reform; (2) economic and social reform and development; (3) 
trade, market and regulatory reform; (4) cooperation and issues relating justice; (5) 
cooperation and reform in sectors such as transport, energy, information society, 
environment, science and research; and (6) “people-to-people” areas such as civil society, 
education, public health, cultural cooperation.  The effectiveness and the progress of the 
implementation of the AP are monitored by ten joint subcommittees and are reported to 
the EU-Jordan Association Council and the EU-Association Committee.269 
However, a cross-national comparison of the effectiveness of the ENP shows that 
progress on the basis of the APs could be achieved if countries were dependent on the EU 
with regard to economic and security issues, such as Armenia, Georgia, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Moldavia and Ukraine.  Vice versa, the EU has been less effective in states 
such as Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Libya, and Syria, which were not dependent 
on the EU and of which at least the former three confront strong Islamist movements.  
Jordan’s economic relations with the EU are marginal in relation to the EU’s worldwide 
trade (0.1 percent) and far behind countries in Jordan’s neighborhood or Morocco, which 
is often compared to Jordan’s political situation.270  Nevertheless, the EU is the most 
important import trade partner of Jordan (€2.6 billion), whereas Jordan’s exports to the 
EU (€0.3 billion in 2008) are insignificant.  Thus, the EU profits from an enhanced 
                                                 
268 E.g., National Social and Economic Development Program for 2009–2011. 
269 Ibid., 9–10. 
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Commission of the European Union, "Trade: Morocco (Bilateral Relations)," 
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economic partnership most.271  By contrast, the U.S. is the largest export market for 
Jordanian goods (30.9 percent of exports in 2005) mainly because of privileged textiles 
and clothing exports to the U.S. (see Qualifying Industrial Zones in the next section).272 
The assessment of the AP by the Center of Security Studies in Jordan (CSS) in 
2008 shows that some progress was made besides the economic sector.  Progress was 
achieved by founding the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, amending the Press and 
Publication Law as well as the Access to Information Law, building judiciary capacity, 
supporting human rights organizations and women’s rights.273 
A report of the EU Commission of 2009 confirms the CSS assessment to a wide 
extent.  The EU assistance to Jordan applies to Jordan’s focus on economic development.  
Jordan’s increasing inflation (14.9 percent in 2008), high poverty rate (14.5 percent are 
living under the poverty line), youth-unemployment, and negative fiscal balance (-5.8 
percent without grants, 7.9 percent including grants) were of main concern.  Moreover, 
despite serious challenges with regard to the implementation of complex EU standards, 
unity of effort between the EU and Jordan could be achieved with regard to security 
threats such as terrorism and migration, and organized crime.  Further cooperation in the 
realms of counter terrorism and organized crime were agreed upon in 2008.  Although 
political reform, democracy, human rights, and good governance are major objectives of 
the EU approach (according to CSP),274 the progress in civil liberties, civil society and 
strengthening parliament and political parties fell short and remained behind the progress 
in the economic and security sectors.  Finally, whereas some progress was made to 
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combat corruption (Anti-Corruption Commission since 2008) and to strengthen the 
capacity of the judiciary (JUST Strategy 2007-2008) and of health care, as well as to 
enforce human rights and to reduce torture, major obstacles as were noted in Chapter II 
on Jordan’s path to democracy could not be removed.275 
The missing success of the EU in Jordan to create a political environment and 
political opportunities that favor democratic competition goes along with EU financial 
efforts.  While the financial support within the scope of ENPI is supposed to increase to 
thirty-two percent (budget of ENPI about twelve billion Euros) until 2013, the promotion 
of civil society and civil liberties ranges below ten percent in total.276  Moreover, the EU 
financial assistance to Jordan is perceived as insufficient, in particular with regard to the 
influx of a half million Iraqi refugees in Jordan.  Nevertheless, as a Jordanian official 
noted, “We can’t deny that the EU provides assistance to Jordan, but the reforms required 
cannot be achieved without the Action Plan that takes into considerations that 
implementing such a plan takes time and sufficient amount of aid.”277 
However, as Figure 8 shows, EU assistance to Jordan has followed trends of 
deliberalization during times of major security threats.  EU assistance to Jordan dropped 
significantly when repression increased in the aftermath of the Second Intifada in late 
2000 and during Jordan’s support of the Iraq War in 2003.  Thus, the strongly varying 
financial EU commitments positively correlate with the perception of civil liberties in 
Jordan in these periods.  However, this does not necessarily mean that the coincidence of 
EU assistance with perceived civil liberties in Jordan follows a certain pattern that 
acknowledges the shortcoming of King Abdullah’s reform agenda.  The variation of EU 
assistance also derives from changes of EU funds.  The assistance of the EU in 2002 
boosted when the NIP was launched in addition to MEDA.  The flexibility to shift 
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expenditures within the scope of NIP enabled the EU to signal its support of Jordan’s 
reform attempts since 2002; but despite decreasing civil liberties in preparation of the 
2007 elections, NIP funds remained unchanged. 
 
Figure 8.   Perceived Civil Liberties in Jordan in Comparison to Trends of EU 
Assistance between 1999 and 2008278 
On the one hand, EU agreements in general and with regard to the case of Jordan 
in particular declare the protection of human rights in accordance with the UN Charter, as 
well as rule of law and democratic principles as being subject of conditionality of EU 
assistance.  According to the strategy of the ENP, “the level of ambition of the EU’s 
relationships with its neighbors will take into account the extent to which these values are 
effectively shared.”279  On the other hand, the EU has very rarely used conditionality to 
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suspend assistance.  A study on EU conditionality shows that suspensions of assistance 
were only successful in times of significant political crisis and conflicts, which do not 
apply to the case of Jordan.  Consequently, these seemingly “double standards” are not 
satisfactory from a liberal point of view but apply to EU’s Realpolitik.280  The 
inconsistency between democratic rhetoric and political conduct is one major facilitator 
for anti-western sentiments as opinion polls in five Arab countries in 2005 showed.281 
Finally, EU assistance to Jordan could not prevent trends of deliberalization in 
Jordan.  It is limited since Jordan’s security concerns mainly derive from its neighboring 
states such as Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where the U.S. rather than the EU 
is able to influence future political developments.  Thus, the EU approach and its 
normative power neither attracts Jordan nor does it put the EU in a position to push the 
Jordanian monarch to political concessions, which might create political opportunities for 
opposing political forces such as the MB.  Instead, the EU profits economically as well as 
with regard to security from Jordan’s status quo.  Conversely, aside from EU funds, the 
monarchy profits from the legitimacy provided by its close relationship with the EU.282  
However, does this approach pay for a long-term perspective of stability in Jordan? 
The perception of the Jordanian public of EU assistance is striking.  According to 
polls in 2008 in Jordan, only 12.7 percent view the EU programs to be fairly distributed.  
Whereas 32.2 percent of the respondents believe that the EU is successfully promoting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, 55.8 percent admitted that they had not heard of 
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the EU-Jordan cooperation in this realm.  In contrast, EU assistance was perceived as 
most successful in combating terrorism (33.8 percent), followed by Jordan’s cooperation 
with regard to security and foreign policy (32.2 percent, elites 44.3 percent).  
Nevertheless, 25.2 percent of the respondents (elites 31.9 percent) perceive the EU as 
ineffective in preventing security threats to Jordan and crises.  In this context, it is 
noteworthy that 48.5 percent highlight the EU’s neutrality with regard to Arab affairs.  
Nevertheless, 54.2 percent accuse the EU of being too pro-U.S.283 
Collectively, this poll shows that more than two-thirds of the respondents see the 
EU predominantly engaged in security issues, but not able to provide the needed security 
for Jordan.  A clear majority (75.5 percent, elites 85.3 percent) wish that the EU would 
take a more independent stance from the U.S. while almost every second embraces the 
role of the EU in ending the “Israeli occupation” and “to deal fairly with Arab issues.”284 
The complex contractual framework of the EU partnership with Jordan ignores 
the role of Islamist movements in Jordan as a legitimate political force, as examined in 
the previous chapters.  Islamism is only addressed in light of religious extremism in 
Jordan.  Since “the standards of the dominant civilization always define modernity,” as 
Bernhard Lewis put it, the EU is convinced that Jordan is a rare example in the region for 
a modern Islamic state.285  In accordance with the Amman message issued in November 
2004, the EU acknowledges Jordan’s fight at the forefront against Islamist extremism.286  
However, the EU fails to address the nuances in the Islamist spectrum and the chances to 
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political force in Jordan.  This dichotomist view does not help reconcile anti-western 
sentiments in the Arab world, nor does it enable democratic progress in Jordan taking 
into account moderate Islamist organizations.287 
Consequently, the EU misses a chance to engage in a closer relationship with 
political Islamism in Jordan.  With reference to a cross-national study on political Islam 
in the Middle East and the ENP, mainstream Islamists who were willing to take part in 
the political process generally embraced EU rather than U.S. assistance.  However, 
Islamists were concerned about the repressive responses, the criticism of political and 
Islamic opponents, and losing popularity.  In addition, they criticized European 
reluctance to push democracy in the region.288  Later research on Islamist radicalization 
in the Middle East showed that European approaches to states in the Middle East have 
not prevented a trend towards radicalization since repression has continued and the 
political influence of moderate Islamists has declined significantly.289 
Nevertheless, the EU acknowledged in its strategy on Combating Radicalisation 
and Recruitment to Terrorism of 2005, “we need to empower moderate voices by 
engaging with Muslim organisations and faith groups that reject the distorted version of 
Islam put forward by al-Qa’ida and others.”290  Moreover, in May 2007, European 
Parliament passed a resolution that “the moderation of Islamism depends on both the 
stability of the institutional framework in which they evolve and the opportunities which 
the latter offers to influence policy-making.”  It further states that the EU should: 
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give visible political support to…those political organisations which 
promote democracy by non-violent means, excluding sectarian, 
fundamentalist and extremist nationalist forces but including, where 
appropriate, secular actors and moderate Islamists…whom Europe has 
encouraged to participate in the democratic process, thus striking a 
balance between culture-based perceptions and political pragmatism. 291 
Cooperation between the EU and Islamist organizations in Jordan depend on the goodwill 
of the ruling regime and the reluctance of the EU to implement its liberal statements into 
practice, not the least of which is because of a lack of unity of effort of its member 
states.292 
2. The U.S. Approach 
The U.S. revised its policy to the Middle East in the aftermath of 9/11 in 
accordance with its assessment that autocratic rule in conjunction with 
underdevelopment, a lack of education, and the repression of women (referring to UN 
Arab Human Development Reports) are the breeding grounds for terrorism and anti-
Americanism.293  A “Forward Strategy for Freedom” should open the doors for 
democracy, human rights, and economic liberalization and provide stability due to the 
paradigm of democratic peace.294 
The new U.S. approach to the Middle East started in 2002 with the Middle East 
Partnership Initiative (MEPI) focusing on: “(1) women's empowerment, (2) educational 
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advancement, (3) economic development, and (4) political participation” based on a 
bottom-up approach.295  Acknowledging that the “battle” against the reasons of terrorism 
has to be fought on many fronts, the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative 
(BMENA) of 2004 sought to address the G8 and the EU.296  While the European member 
states were skeptical about meeting manifold challenges in the Middle East with one 
approach while missing to incorporate the Arab-Israeli conflict and an Arab ownership, 
the Arab world harshly criticized the BMENA as an attempt of interference in internal 
affairs of Arab states and western cultural ignorance.297 
As a consequence of the broad front of Arab and European criticism, new U.S.-
driven initiatives were added, such as the G8 Initiative “Partnership for Progress and a 
Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa” and the 
“NATO Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” complementary to already existing initiatives 
and programs.  Whereas the G8 initiative was an attempt to harmonize the BMENA with 
already existing initiatives of the G8, the NATO initiative was a complimentary 
contribution focusing on security and stability while fostering military cooperation and 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialog.298 
However, since these initiatives are based on the least common dominator of the 
countries’ interests, their effectiveness and coherence is low.  For instance, with regard to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, neither the EU nor the U.S. was able to send a clear signal of 
willingness to push the peace process.  The multilateral initiatives degenerated to 
“shopping lists” of single projects while missing a comprehensive approach.  
Nonetheless, although the success of these initiatives is highly contested, the awareness 
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of an authoritarian Middle East with regard to democratic Zeitgeist changed.  It became 
clear that the conduct of former Arab-U.S. relations was at least rhetorically adjusted by 
the U.S. Autocrats were urged to signal their willingness to give more political 
participation to their populations and to respect human rights.  Thus, the path of political 
transition was rhetorically paved; whether noticeable democratic changes in the Middle 
East will occur and consolidate remains to be seen.299 
As noted, Jordan’s economic and military weakness with regard to its challenging 
geostrategic situation in a hostile neighborhood needs a strong ally who is able to 
influence Jordan’s neighboring states.  Thus, Jordan’s former alliance with Great Britain 
and later with the U.S. has historical roots and strategic reasons.  According to U.S. 
commitments to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq with regard to its military presence, 
arms sales, and economic aid, Jordan’s stability is closely connected with U.S. policy in 
the region.300 
The assistance by the U.S. to Jordan dates back to 1951.  Since then, U.S. 
assistance has been a significant policy tool to support U.S. interests in the region.  
Assistance to Jordan was suspended when Jordan backed Iraq in the Gulf Crisis in the 
early 1990s, but it has increased significantly since Jordan’s policy of reconciliation with 
Israel (peace treaty in 1994).301  Not surprisingly, the assistance to Jordan quadrupled 
between 1998 and 2008 when Jordan became a crucial cornerstone of the War on Terror 
and an important bridgehead to the Middle East, especially since the Iraq War in 2003.  
The United States’ assistance to Jordan averaged over $700 million per year since 
2003.302  Thus, it is noteworthy that U.S. military assistance is on average higher than EU 
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financial commitments combined (see Figure 9).303  However, as in the case of the EU, 
U.S. efforts in Jordan are driven by economic assistance, not the least of which is in 
response to Jordan’s performance in security and its vital role in supporting the U.S. 
efforts in Iraq, such as training of Iraqi security forces as well as logistical support and 
military equipment.304  
As shown in Chapter III, and in contrast to increasing U.S. economic and military 
assistance, liberalization in Jordan has stagnated since King Abdullah II ascended the 
throne in 1999 (see Figure 10).  The effects of U.S. assistance on the monarchy’s stability 
seem to contradict the objectives of U.S. democracy promotion.  While the regime’s 
stability was strengthened by military and economic assistance, in particular after 
Jordan’s role in combating terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 and in light of the Iraq War, 
the perceived civil liberties reached bottom in 2001 and stayed at a low level until 2004.  
Conversely, when the perceived liberties peaked, U.S. assistance to Jordan stagnated in 
2006.  Finally, U.S. assistance increased in 2008 when Hamas mobilized in Jordan 
against the war in the Gaza strip while Jordan increased its efforts in supporting the 
Palestinian Authority.305 
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Figure 9.   U.S. Assistance to Jordan Since 1999306 
 
 
Figure 10.   Perceived Civil Liberties in Jordan Since 1999307 
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In addition to Jordan’s access to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 
2001 and the EU/Jordan association agreement of 2002, since 1998 the U.S. designated 
thirteen Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Jordan.  The QIZ are conditioned to joint 
Israeli-Jordanian products designated to exports to the U.S.  Consequently, in accordance 
with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 2000, Jordan is able to export goods to the U.S. 
duty-free if the products share an Israeli input of eight percent.  Jordanian exports to the 
U.S. “grew from $15 million in 1997 to more than $1 billion in 2004” and are supposed 
to create jobs and attract foreign investment.308  However, instead of a boost in 
employment, 74 percent of currently 43,000 employed workers are from Southeast Asia 
since Jordanians are viewed as less skilled.309  
As discussed in Chapter II regarding the downsizing of social welfare, “the focus 
in the past ten years was on the economic front and very little was done on the social 
front” as Dr. Halaiqah, a leading figure of Jordan’s economic reform agenda, states.310  
Jordan’s economic growth has not benefited most Jordanians.311  Rather, it bolstered the 
business community, maintained budget security, and, therefore, stabilized the status 
quo.312  Economic “shocks” as in the 1980s, which led to Jordan’s most substantial 
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political openings, as well as political shocks in Jordan’s neighborhood, are countered by 
economic and military assistance.  Before the boost in U.S. assistance in 2003, the U.S. 
provided 60 percent of the grant assistance, whereas the EU provided 23 percent in 
2002.313  Moreover, the Jordanian government uses U.S. Economic Support Funds (45 
percent) to ease the burden of debts.  Between 1997 and 2006, the “USAID [United 
States Agency for International Development] has provided $1.163 billion for the cash 
transfer program” and additional $700 million during the Iraq War in 2003 (see Figure 
9).314 
Consequently, Jordan’s strong backing of the U.S. since 9/11 and its role in 
stabilizing Iraq shaped U.S. assistance.  Thus, political and economic shocks from outside 
Jordan are countered by the U.S. since instability in Jordan threatens U.S. effort in Iraq, 
challenges U.S. commitments in Israel, and might weaken the front against terrorism.  
Therefore, a realist approach of “status quo” prevails over “democratic change” in Jordan 
as the liberalist camp advocates.  Thus, as well as in the case of the EU, U.S. assistance to 
Jordan is inconsistent, using double standards with regard to its Realpolitik versus 
manifold programs to foster democracy at the grassroots level.  Therefore, Islamist 
organizations such as the MB in Jordan, which might challenge the power of the regime, 
are not welcome.  With regard to Islamist terrorism in Jordan, the rise of Hamas in 
Palestine and objections of Islamists in Jordan against the U.S. policy in the Middle East, 
“the U.S. seems willing to accept whatever pace the government sets for the political 
process.”315 
In this context, a study of the Egyptian reform process showed that approaches to 
cooperate with moderate Islamist movements were rejected by the U.S. and the regime.  
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Conversely, pro-reform forces refrained from cooperating with the U.S. as a consequence 
of harsh regime repression.  Consequently, besides ideological reasons, moderate 
Islamists will not support U.S. assistance, since the U.S. does not push the regimes to 
refrain from repression and to include Islamists in the political process.316  Thus, 
conditionality of U.S. assistance in Jordan applies to U.S. realist interests but not to the 
liberal paradigm of democracy and human rights.  This conduct of U.S. assistance might 
contradict U.S. legislation since 1974, which conditions U.S. aid to the benefit of the 
needy, human rights and democratic principles.317 
Nevertheless, an ideological-driven approach of promoting democracy to contain 
terrorism would overshadow a possible pragmatic approach to Islamist organizations, 
which should acknowledge that democracy comes in many forms and not as a uniform 
worldwide process.318  The latest research showed that states in transition to democracy, 
and even consolidated democracies, are more vulnerable to terrorism than 
dictatorships.319  Moreover, a cross-national study of the relationship between terrorism 
and different regimes in the Middle East shows that including moderate Islamist 
organizations in the political process is likely to fail if regimes and their political 
institutions are weak.320  Therefore, U.S. attempts to strengthen the Jordanian Parliament 
are evident.  As the EU established a political dialogue at the political party level and 
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cooperation between the European and Jordanian Parliament,321 USAID funded 
programs to strengthen the Jordanian Parliament as well as to train Jordanian political 
parties, however, focusing on gender issues.322  “While some IAF members, particularly 
women, may participate in U.S.-sponsored workshops, there is no concerted effort among 
U.S. diplomats in Amman to engage.”323  These initiatives do not engage in removing 
major obstacles on Jordan’s path to democracy since neutrality and nonpartisanship for 
staying in “business” is key.  If political elites perceive that U.S. programs have an 
“agenda,” the success of these programs would be threatened since U.S. attempt of 
promoting democracy is perceived as opportunistic and hostile to Islam.324  Thus, foreign 
actors in general and the U.S. in particular are limited in promoting reforms in particular 
regarding the noted obstacles of Jordan’s path to democracy.  Finally, “the final outcome 
in each country [in the Middle East] would owe much more to domestic factors than to 
the vigor of U.S. and European reformist zeal.”325 
C. CONCLUSION 
Strategic ends of the U.S. and the EU in the Middle East in general, and with 
regard to Jordan in particular, do not substantially differ.  Nevertheless, the EU’s foreign 
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policy is dominated by a civilian approach, whereas the U.S. incorporates a more 
prominent role of its military assistance.326  Differences in both approaches derive from 
different geostrategic perspectives, Jordan’s special relationship with the U.S., and the 
availability of different capabilities.  However, security in the European neighborhood 
depends on U.S. priorities in the Middle East such as in Iraq or Palestine.327  Moreover, 
the EU’s attractiveness with regard to its normative power does not apply to Jordan and 
does not significantly address the concerns of Jordan, which has maintained a close 
relationship with the U.S.  Jordan’s destiny depends on security in its neighborhood and 
economic assistance by the U.S.  Therefore, EU assistance to Jordan is perceived as a 
necessary “add on” but is not sufficient regarding Jordan’s major concerns.  Jordan takes 
what it needs to stabilize the monarchy and rejects substantial change, which might 
threaten the regime’s stability.  Consequently, in contrast to the U.S., EU assistance to 
Jordan does not have the power to force the Jordanian regime to push for further 
liberalization that favors the political inclusion of opposing political forces. 
The U.S. and the EU seem to acknowledge the difficult domestic and geostrategic 
situation in which Jordan operates.  Thus, rhetorical and contractual commitments to 
democratic developments in Jordan are kalaam fadi (“empty words”) since democratic 
efforts fall behind economic progress and security concerns.  Major obstacles that hinder 
a transition to democracy such as the Election Law, weak political institutions (foremost 
parliament and political parties), and repression have not been removed during U.S. and 
EU assistance, but have become even more substantial.  Thus, political change is likely to 
emerge by political and economic “shocks” from outside Jordan if they are not countered 
by EU and U.S. assistance.328  Neither the EU nor the U.S. is willing to push the 
Jordanian regime too hard since short-term realist interests outweigh long-term liberal 
goals.  Besides security assistance, approaches of the U.S. and the EU focus on economic 
assistance following the modernization paradigm.  As in Jordan’s case, Przeworski and 
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Limongi’s quantitative research in 1997 shows that economic development did not turn 
an authoritarian regime into a democratic one.329 
Nevertheless, the EU is seen in a positive light while the U.S. is not.  Since the 
EU lacks substantial influence on Jordan’s development, the EU cannot and is not willing 
to take advantage of these circumstances.  The EU has to cooperate with the U.S. to 
provide security and stability in its neighborhood, while the U.S. should take advantage 
of the EU civil capabilities in order to develop a common gradual approach that fosters 
stability along with substantial political opening while strengthening political institutions 
that can handle the democratic process.330 
Finally, the realist approach of status quo prevails as stability of Jordan’s “hybrid 
regime” comes first.  Neither the U.S. nor the EU has implemented an approach to 
Islamist organizations in Jordan.  Clear objectives on how to engage with Islamist 
movements in Jordan must be defined.331  Thus, U.S. military and economic assistance to 
Jordan and the EU’s reluctance has promoted a policy of deliberalization that hinders the 
MB’s political influence.  Besides efforts at the grassroots level, the U.S. and the EU 
should put more effort into the political process, which creates political opportunities for 
moderate Islamist organizations, as the EU addressed in its strategy “Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” of 2005 and in its resolution of May 2007.  
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that ideological intersections exist and can be exploited for political inclusion and 
moderation of radical strands.332  Thus, a rethinking of U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan 
is necessary to provide long-term stability.333 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis sheds light on the Jordanian regime with regard to preventing 
democratic progress in general, and political opportunities for opposing political forces 
such as the MB in particular.  In this context, neither the U.S. nor the EU has been willing 
to push the Jordanian regime to a political opening that favors a substantial inclusion of 
the MB as the most promising political opposition in Jordan.  Assistance by the EU and 
the U.S. has followed a realist approach maintaining the status quo instead of promoting 
democracy in Jordan. 
 
Figure 11.   Corruption Perception Index, Rule of Law, and the Human Development 
Index in Comparison334 
                                                 
334 United Nations Development Program, "Arab Statistics - Home Page," http://www.arabstats.org/ 
(accessed May 1, 2010). 
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Nevertheless, as Figure 11 shows, Jordan ranks at the top for good governance, 
taking together significant indicators such as the “Corruption Perception Index” (2009) 
and “Rule of Law” (2008) in Jordan.335  According to data provided by the UN, World 
Bank, and Transparency International, Jordan not only outbids its neighboring countries 
such as Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, but also promising cases in the Maghreb such as 
Tunisia and Morocco.  In addition, living conditions measured by the Human 
Development Index (HDI 2007) ranks third in the region.336  Even as far as “voice and 
accountability” (not depicted in Figure 11) is concerned, Jordan ranks third behind 
Lebanon and Morocco in 2007.337  Consequently, Jordan is a bridgehead for western 
interests in the region, which also bodes well for Jordanians in comparison with Arab 
countries in Jordan’s neighborhood.  Thus, the realist approach of the U.S. and the EU 
seems to pay off. 
However, Jordan’s positive stance in the Arab world is elusive as its democratic 
façade shows.  The regime’s policy of repression and electoral engineering has 
undermined the emergence of political structures that enable fair political competition 
and the mediation of political demands by civil society.  Since the mid-1990s, the regime 
systematically prevented political opportunities by repression and limited political access 
while successfully maintaining the “power map” of Jordanian elites.  While economic 
and security issues in Jordan were dominant, social welfare declined, whereas 
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unemployment and inflation increased.  Thus, this trend might offer an opportunity for 
Islamist organizations to undermine the regime’s legitimacy in general.  However, the 
weakness of political institutions and the mistrust of Jordanians in political representation 
in Jordan threaten the long-term stability in Jordan in particular.  Increasing clientelism in 
conjunction with the Palestinian-Transjordan divide and rifts within public opinion about 
Jordan’s political future hampers political opposition from gaining momentum.  As 
political participation does not pay, radical and apolitical strands of Islamism might gain 
strength in the future as Salafism has become more popular.  Thus, while political 
opportunities for moderate Islamist strands are not likely to emerge, radical strands 
benefit from missing political access and repression in light of the regime’s pro-western 
policy.  Consequently, Jordan’s prospects of a transition from authoritarian rule to a 
democracy are highly constrained while the costs of political inclusion of moderate 
Islamists have increased in the absence of strong institutions, which could handle 
political competition.  Macroeconomic improvements and Jordan’s performance with 
regard to good governance and transparency have not led to more political liberalization. 
Since the “pact” between the monarchy and the MB was abolished by King 
Abdullah II, MB influence in the legal political framework diminished while repression 
continued along with security threats in Jordan’s neighborhood.  Nevertheless, since the 
MB’s foundation in 1945, it has demonstrated that it acts strategically.  Its ideational 
pragmatism, as well as the organizational benefits of its accommodative stance with the 
regime, has prevented a radicalization despite repression and limited political access 
since the mid-1990s. 
Significant political “shocks” in Jordan’s neighborhood, such as the War in Iraq 
in 2003, shaped the MB political agenda, which contradicts western interests.  However, 
a confrontation with the regime is not likely as long as its organizational structures are 
not threatened and ideological concessions do not outweigh the benefits of the MB’s 
accommodative stance.  Nevertheless, as the regime’s pro-western policy along with 
repression and limited political access continues or even increases during King 
Abdullah’s reign, the MB might also lose its potential to attract “fence-sitters” in order to 
contain radical Islamist strands from gaining momentum.  Thus, the continuation of a 
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status quo in Jordan further weakens the MB political stance, strengthens radical Islamist 
strands, and threatens the Jordanian regime, as alternative legitimate political forces, 
which are loyal to the regime, are not available. 
As empirical evidence in the Middle East about successful inclusion of moderate 
Islamists is weak, it remains uncertain how the MB will act if it assumes political 
power.338  Nevertheless, the worst-case scenario that Islamists will impose Shari’ah 
under autocratic rule is less likely since neither the MB, the Jordanian public, or Jordan’s 
elites favor a drift or a revolution into a theocracy.  By contrast, the biggest threat to 
Jordan’s transition to democracy derives from the co-optation of the MB as the remaining 
effective opposing political force in Jordan.  This scenario would bolster the public 
mistrust in political representation as well as weaken the belief in democratic progress 
and the credibility of moderate Islamists such as the MB to the benefit of radical and 
apolitical Islamist strands in Jordan.  Therefore, Springborg concludes, “authoritarianism 
is bad enough, but an Islamist authoritarianism would be even worse for the countries 
themselves as well as their neighbours and indeed for much of the rest of the world.”339 
However, since substantial political inclusion of the MB and political 
opportunities are missing, future scenarios remain uncertain.  The MB is the only 
legitimate social and political force that has the organizational and ideological 
prerequisites to promote an endogenous democratic progress from within Jordan.  
Besides its strategic behavior, its ideology has the potential to incorporate multiple 
identities in Jordan against increasing clientelism, while radical strands remain exclusive 
and other moderate strands are weak.  The question is whether the MB is able or willing 
to mobilize the discontent in Jordan’s public since moderate factions of the MB and 
public opinion acknowledges that Jordan’s hostile neighborhood does not allow for rapid 
political change. 
Nevertheless, a substantial political inclusion of the MB will bode well for 
Jordan’s democratic progress.  Moderation of radical ideas of the MB took place, as 
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strategic behavior prevailed and concessions were necessary to achieve the MB’s goals.  
A political opening will encourage the debate between the MB’s multiple factions and 
create conditions for further moderation, but also for splinter movements.  This process is 
supposed to lead to a diversification of the Islamist spectrum as competition and political 
accountability increases.  The political ambiguity of Islamist organizations will be 
replaced by concrete political agendas to attract the different political factions in Jordan’s 
society.  As long as democracy is not practiced in Jordan, Jordanians will not experience 
the benefits of having a democracy.  Finally, Jordan’s democracy will not follow an 
exogenous western approach as long as they perceive western interference as unjust and 
selfish. 
In this context, the EU and U.S. missed a chance to promote a policy in Jordan 
that favors a substantial inclusion of moderate Islamists such as the MB.  The realist 
approach of both actors highlights the short-term benefits of Jordan’s status quo but fails 
to address the preconditions of long-term stability maintained by an endogenous process 
based on political liberalization.  Besides Jordan’s good “grades” with regard to good 
governance, Jordan has the potential to become a role model for a successful inclusion of 
moderate Islamist organizations, which benefits western interests with regard to stability 
for the region.  Western credibility in negotiating present and future conflicts in the 
Middle East is crucial when it comes to vital western security interests.  Thus, U.S. and 
EU must adjust their point of main effort in assistance to Jordan.  Economic and security 
assistance to Jordan is not sufficient in addressing the obstacles of democratic progress in 
Jordan.  The U.S. and the EU should not prevent political opportunities, but push and 
assist the Jordanian regime to create political structures that enable political competition. 
In this regard, the EU and the U.S. have the basis for task sharing.  The EU and 
the U.S. share common ends but take different geostrategic perspectives.  Whereas the 
EU focuses on stability in Jordan to promote security in its neighborhood, the U.S. uses 
Jordan as a secure bridgehead to address its interests in the broader Middle East.  
Nevertheless, the security in the EU’s neighborhood depends on U.S. policy in the 
Middle East such as in Iraq and Palestine.  Moreover, whereas the EU is unable to 
provide security in Jordan’s neighborhood, the U.S. is able to address Jordan’s security 
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concerns.  Nevertheless, the EU’s institutional power, civil capabilities, and coherent 
strategy offer a comprehensive approach to foster Jordan’s path to democracy.  While the 
U.S. is able to push democratization in Jordan but lacks credibility in Jordan’s public and 
within the moderate Islamist spectrum, the EU is seen in a more positive light willing to 
handle political accommodation with Islamists.  The EU is able to assist democratic 
progress along with institution building as the EU’s historic enlargement shows.340 
The question is whether the U.S. and the EU can work out this burden sharing in a 
reasonable fashion and how might it work on the ground.  In addition, too many unclear 
“variables” in Jordan’s neighborhood such as the development in Iraq and the stalled 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process do not encourage the U.S. and the EU to take further 
security risks in the region.  Nevertheless, security risks increase as the democratic 
progress in Jordan falls short and radical Islamism gains momentum.  Thus, Jordan has 
the potential to provide security as it successfully reconciles Islamism with democracy 
while the U.S. and the EU gain credibility to the benefit of many conflicts and crises in 
the Middle East. 
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